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Abstract 
 
How can family businesses be managed and directed to achieve better economic and 
social outcomes? Despite that family businesses are a group of heterogenous companies, 
little attention has been given to governance and institutional contingencies when 
discussing the family business economic and social performance. This resulted in several 
theoretical debates and conflicting evidence found in the literature. This thesis accounts 
for family business heterogeneity to shed further light into the managerial and governance 
choices that can catalyze family businesses economic and social performance. Three 
understudied sources of family businesses heterogeneity are explored: The various 
attitudes, skills, and services of the family business human capital, the different levels of 
family involvement in the business, and the institutional geographical setting in which 
family businesses are embedded. This thesis theoretically argues for and empirically 
explores managerial and governance choices that can catalyze family businesses 
economic and social outcomes. By doing so, this work offers several theoretical 
contributions that can help reconcile conflicting views found in the literature and provides 
finer-grained recommendations for practitioners.                      
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1 
 
General Introduction 
 
 
Family businesses are highly present all over the world and can account for up to 90% of 
all forms of enterprises (La Porta et al., 1999; Parada, 2016). As a result, family 
businesses became extremely important for the world economy (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003), by significantly contributing to their country’s GDP and by providing a major 
source of employment. These elements increased scholarly interest in family business 
research to answer important questions that can serve practitioners and policy makers in 
better managing family businesses. 
 
Family business research starts from the assumption that family and business are two 
interconnected institutions having both conflicting and harmonious logics (Miller et al., 
2011; Sharma, 2004). Research suggests that family businesses are formed by two sub-
systems (i.e. family and business) and that their combination has the potential to yield a 
competitive advantage or disadvantage for the family organization (Habbershon et al., 
2003). In this regard, scholarly inquiry has focused on determining how to effectively 
manage the family inside the business to achieve better economic and social outcomes 
(Sharma et al., 2007). In the last four decades, a significant body of theoretical and 
empirical work accumulated (e.g. Daspit et al., 2017). These studies have shown that 
management of family businesses differs significantly from that of non-family firms (e.g. 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2010, 2012; 
Kellermanns et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Particularly, it has been shown that 
governance, goals, resources, and the ability of family controlling owners to have some 
level of self-control (Lubatkin et al., 2007) are key factors distinguishing family 
businesses from their non-family counterparts (e.g. Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2013; 
Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Sharma, 2004). 
 
Yet, while we know that family businesses are different, little consent exists on how and 
why do family businesses differ from their non-family counterparts. This is exacerbated 
by the fact that there is still little to no consent on how family businesses should be 
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directed and managed to achieve optimal performance outcomes. Moreover, performance 
should be measured according to the firm’s goals. In the distinctive context of family 
firms, non-economic goals are at least as important as economic outcomes (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007; Chrisman et al., 2012). Hence, a single focus on economic goals paints an 
incomplete picture of family firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2012). Therefore, this 
thesis addresses aspects reflecting family business economic goals (reflected by firm 
economic performance) and non-economic goals (reflected by a desire to be perceived as 
socially responsible through achieving fairness in the workplace, and through increasing 
environmental social performance). Yet, consent on how can family businesses achieve 
their economic and non-economic goals is still missing. For example, while some 
scholars argue that family employees are opportunistic and self-interested and 
recommend agency governance mechanisms to control their behavior (e.g. Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; Chua et al., 2009; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2001,2003; 
Verbeke and Kano, 2012); others argue that family employees are stewards of the 
business showing extraordinary commitment in the workplace and sacrificing their own 
self-interest for the family group’s interest (e.g. Arregle et al., 2007; Corbetta and 
Salvatto, 2004a; Denison et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2010; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 
2007). As a result, empirical work has yet to provide conclusive evidence on how family 
business employees should be managed and directed and how family involvement affects 
business economic and social outcomes (Madison et al., 2016). 
 
One of the main reasons for these competing claims and conflicting results is that, in the 
literature, there is still no agreement on a single definition or a single operationalization 
of a family firm (Chua et al., 2012) or on the behavioral assumptions that reflect the 
attitudes of family business employees in the workplace (Madison et al., 2016). 
Consequently, heterogenous forms of family businesses have been theoretically 
considered and empirically operationalized as a homogenous group of companies 
(Garcia-Castro and Cassasola, 2011). This homogenous consideration is surprising and 
unfortunate, especially that the variation of behaviour among family businesses can be 
greater than the variation of behaviour between family and non-family businesses and 
can explain several competing arguments and conflicting evidence found in the literature 
(Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 2012). For example, can family businesses 
embedded in a Collectivist cultural setting (where individuals prioritize the family group 
interests over their self-interest) be treated the same as family businesses embedded in an 
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Individualist cultural setting (where individuals prioritize their self-interest over the 
family group interests)? To complicate things more, can a 100% family owned company 
be treated the same as the 5% family owned firm? Moreover, in practice, family firms 
might be fully managed and directed by family members, fully managed and directed by 
non-family members, or have a mix of family and non-family members in the 
management team and on the board of directors. 
 
Each of these governance configurations might create different opportunities and 
challenges for family businesses to achieve optimal levels of economic and social 
performance. Hence, as nicely expressed by Chrisman et al. (2007 p.1006): “Knowledge 
about different types of families in business and the mixtures of interests, involvement 
and relationships found in those families and businesses will contribute to the ability to 
explain variations in family firm behaviour and performance.” In this regard, three sub-
groups of contextual factors are recognized to be the source of family businesses 
heterogeneity: 1) the chrono context which traces the changes and evolutions in the 
organizational life 2) the meso-context which encompasses the governance, resources, 
and goals of the family business; and 3) the institutional context which is broadly 
characterized by the economic, legal, social, political, and cultural context in which 
family businesses are embedded (Wright et al., 2014).  
 
 The focus of this thesis is on the meso-context and on the institutional context in which 
family businesses are embedded. More specifically, the focus of this thesis is on the 
heterogeneity of attitudes of family business employees inside the business (Barnett and 
Kellermanns, 2006; Chua et al., 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2007), on the level of family 
involvement in ownership management and direction (Garcia-Castro and Casasola, 
2011), and on the wider institutional cultural and legal context in which family businesses 
are embedded (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). All these elements are considered as 
critical but understudied sources of family businesses heterogeneity that can either foster 
or constrain family businesses ability to achieve their economic and non-economic goals 
(Wright et al., 2014). To address these gaps, through conceptual and empirical research, 
this thesis provides a step forward towards reconciling several competing arguments and 
conflicting evidence found in the literature, therefore bringing context to sensitive 
theoretical contributions and making finer-grained recommendations for family business 
controlling owners, managers, and policy makers. 
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 In the empirical papers, a configurational approach is used to explore family business 
economic and non-economic performance outcomes, therefore heeding the growing calls 
to explore the consequences of family business heterogeneity through a configurational 
approach (Nordqvist et al., 2014). Particularly, empirical papers use fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (FsQCA) as an analytical research method. FsQCA is an 
increasingly popular research method in management (Fiss, 2007, 2011) and in family 
business research (Garcia-Castro and Casasola, 2011; Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014) 
that allows to investigate heterogeneous combinations of causal conditions leading to a 
certain outcome (Ragin, 2008). Through adopting a configurational approach and 
embracing equifinality, FsQCA combines the in-depth understanding provided by 
qualitative research with the rigor of quantitative methodologies in a way that allows a 
deeper understanding of the sufficient and necessary causal conditions that explain an 
outcome (Fiss, 2007, 2011; Ragin, 2008). The advantages and disadvantages of this novel 
research method are extensively discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
 
The body of this thesis is formed by a compendium of three publications to which the 
author has contributed to theory building, data collecting, and data analysis. The author 
also took the lead in writing the introduction and discussing the results. The body of this 
thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores how should fairness be practiced in the 
family business workplace? There has been a taken for granted assumption in the 
literature that the privileged treatment of family business employees relative to their non-
family counterparts will always be non-meritocratic, will automatically indicate 
unfairness, and will always lead to negative reputation and performance consequences. 
This assumption is challenged in this chapter by highlighting that greater equality does 
not necessarily mean greater equity. Previous literature shows that the skills, attitudes, 
and services of family and non-family employees differ by nature. Hence, to answer 
whether fairness exists, one must make careful consideration to the work inputs of each 
individual of these two groups.  To deal with this complicated endeavour, this chapter 
builds on Leventhal’s (1980) and Van der Heyden et al’s. (2005) discussion of a fair 
process to provide a prerequisite and four steps as a possible solution for family business 
decision makers to achieve fairness between family and non-family employees. In 
addition, through several exemplary cases, this chapter shows that the privileged 
treatment of family employees is sometimes, but not always, non-meritocratic. In 
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addition, this chapter shows that, when fairness exists, the family business is able to gain 
reputation and performance advantages.  
 
While chapter 2 focuses on fairness in the workplace as a social outcome, chapter 3 
explores the effect of family involvement on the environmental social performance of 
family firms. Previous studies have investigated the environmental social performance of 
family firms compared to that of non-family firms. However, the literature is surrounded 
by competing arguments and conflicting evidence (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Campopiano 
et al., 2014; Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Morck and Yeung, 2004). For that 
reason, the question has shifted from simply asking whether family firms exhibit higher 
social performance than their non-family counterparts to explore, among family firms, 
what are the optimal governance configurations that can drive forward their 
environmental social performance? This chapter builds on the socio-emotional wealth 
(SEW) perspective by arguing that family firms may sometimes, but not always, exhibit 
high levels of environmental social performance. Through this paper, heterogenous 
family business forms are empirically explored using data collected by the Successful 
Transgenerational Entrepreneurship Project which provides information about companies 
from all over the world. This allows to explore optimal configurations of family business 
governance structures across different institutional settings. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on economic performance which is at least equally important for family 
businesses as their social performance. Economic performance enables family businesses 
to fulfil their desire to preserve the family dynasty through the business and to transfer a 
successful business to future generations (Bingham et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). In this regard, the family business governance structure is considered as a key 
determinant for its success or failure (Steier et al., 2015). When discussing governance 
structures, one of the most important institutions, if not the most important institution, in 
organizations is the board of directors. The board of directors sets the strategic direction 
of the firm and is responsible for maintaining its long-term performance (Judge and 
Talaulicar, 2017). In environments where family ownership is ubiquitous, the importance 
of the board of directors’ structure is exacerbated (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Bammens 
et al., 2011; Corbetta and Salvatto, 2004b). This is because there is still no consent on 
whether family members involved in the business should be considered and treated as 
agents (Chua et al., 2009; Schulze et al., 2003) or as stewards (Corbetta and Salvatto, 
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2004; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). This creates a challenge when deciding whether 
agency or stewardship governance mechanisms must be in place and when deciding who 
should sit on the board of directors. Using qualitative comparative analysis on a sample 
of 74 Lebanese companies, this chapter explores the effect of having independent 
directors on the board across different configurations of family business governance 
structures in an intriguing Collectivist cultural setting. Results show that, depending on 
the family business governance structure, the presence of independent directors may lead 
to either positive or negative performance consequences.  
 
Therefore, without further ado, how can we manage family business heterogeneity to 
achieve better economic and social outcomes? 
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2 
 
 Practicing fairness in the family business 
workplace 
 
 
 
This article is published in Business Horizons 
 
 
 
 
One of the main challenges facing family firms is achieving fairness between family and 
non-family employees in the workplace. Family and non-family employees have the 
potential to offer unique and distinct contributions to the firm, which makes the 
achievement of fairness between them messy and complicated. Hence, two interesting 
questions are worth exploring: Given the complex nature of the family business human 
capital, how can family firms achieve fairness between family and non-family 
employees? Why should family business decision makers and advisors promote fair 
practices in the family business workplace? We first introduce a fair process model as a 
possible solution for family businesses to achieve fairness between family and non-family 
employees. Then, based on several examples and studies, we show that family business 
owners can benefit significantly from promoting fairness in the workplace both in terms 
of preserving business reputation and in terms of achieving long-term family business 
survival and success. 
 
 
 
Reference of the article: 
Samara, G., & Arenas, D. (2017). Practicing fairness in the family business 
workplace. Business Horizons, 60(5), 647-655. 
 
 
 
Latest quality indicators of Business Horizons:  
 
Impact factor: 2.157   
Q1 in Business and International Management and Q3 in Marketing  
Source: SJR 
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2.1 Fairness in the family business workplace 
At Jones Food, family members exclusively held top managerial positions (Schein, 1999). 
At Lazard LLC, family employees received higher salaries than their non-family 
counterparts even when both parties occupied the same hierarchical level (Subramanian 
& Sherman, 2007). At Magid Glove, only family employees are permitted flexible work 
schedules (Ward & Perricelli, 2005). At HOLDAL Group, family members exclusively 
occupy seats on the board of directors. Does this preferential treatment of family 
employees always reflect unfair practices in the family business workplace, and how do 
these actions affect firm function and performance? 
 
Recent articles have suggested that family businesses exercise unfair practices in their 
workplace by offering preferential treatment to family employees (e.g., Chua, Chrisman, 
& Bergiel, 2009; Cruz, Larraza-Kintana, Garcés-Galdeano, & Berrone, 2014; 
Kellermanns, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2012; Zientara, 2015). In this regard, Kidwell, 
Eddleston, Cater, and Kellermanns (2013) emphasized that the preferential treatment of 
an unqualified family member can lead to detrimental effects on the function and 
performance of a family business. Similarly, Khanin (2013) showed that turnover 
intentions of unqualified family members should be supported and encouraged to achieve 
optimal firm performance. However, Khanin also argued that having qualified family 
employees in top managerial positions should be maintained, encouraged, and supported 
because family employees are able to offer unique skills and services that cannot be 
offered by non-family employees. Accordingly, the privileged treatment of family 
employees (e.g., family employees occupying top managerial positions, 
overcompensation of family members relative to their non-family counterparts) does not 
necessarily reflect unfair practices in the workplace. In fact, the family firm human capital 
is complex as family and non-family employees’ knowledge, abilities, skills, and sources 
of motivation differ by nature (Dawson, 2012; Habbershon & Williams, 1999). This 
makes achieving fairness in the family business workplace a messy and complicated 
endeavor (Lansberg, 1989). 
 
To deal with this complex situation, we offer an in-depth discussion of these two 
questions: Given the complex nature of the family business human capital, how can 
family firms achieve fairness between family and non-family employees? Why should 
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family business decision makers and advisors promote fair practices in the family 
business workplace? 
Through this article, we first highlight the distinctive features of a family firm. Second, 
we discuss the complex nature of the family firm human capital and we argue that a mix 
of equality and equity should be present in the family firm workplace in order to achieve 
fairness between family and non-family employees. In this regard, we introduce for 
family business owners, managers, and advisors four steps and a prerequisite as a possible 
solution for family firms to achieve fairness in the workplace. Last, we outline the threats 
family businesses face as a result of unfair workplace practices and what advantages 
family businesses can gain from promoting fair practices in the family business 
workplace. 
 
2.2 What are family firms? 
Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999, p. 25) defined a family firm as: 
A business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of 
the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a 
small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of 
the family or families. 
 
Moreover, it has been suggested that what distinguishes family firms from other forms of 
enterprises is the desire of family business controlling owners to preserve their 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). At its core, SEW represents the stock of affect-related value that 
the family gains from its involvement in the business. It includes an emotional attachment 
to the firm, a close identification with its name, a desire for family influence and control, 
endurance, long-term performance, and family succession (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2012). Gains and losses of SEW are considered a critical reference point that guide 
the decisions of family controlling owners (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
As such, because of the controlling owners’ concern with preserving family influence and 
control, a significant number of family firms extend preferential treatment exclusively to 
family employees (e.g., Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2015). For example, family 
employees receive better performance appraisals (Verbeke & Kano, 2012), are 
overcompensated (Chua et al., 2009), and are provided with better leadership 
opportunities (Covin, 1994) relative to their non-family counterparts. Moreover, non-
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family employees are often considered as ineligible for stock option rewards (Gedajlovic 
& Carney, 2010) and are excluded from opportunities for succession (Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling, & Dino, 2005). 
 
Yet, the disparity between family and non-family employees, while existing, does not 
necessarily indicate unfairness. Family and non-family employees have different sets of 
knowledge, skills, capabilities, and sources of motivation (Block, Millán, Román, & 
Zhou, 2015; Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010; Dawson, 2012; Habbershon & Williams, 
1999). As a result, a starting point to promote fairness in the family firm workplace is to 
understand the complex nature of the family firm human capital, which we discuss in the 
next section. 
 
2.3 The complex nature of family firm human capital 
Both family and non-family employees have the potential to offer unique and distinct 
contributions to the family firm. Non-family employees can offer a point of view based 
on logic and rational analysis (Dyer, 1986) and might be less likely than family employees 
to generate costs from consuming private benefits (Block & Jaskiewicz, 2007). 
Additionally, non-family employees come from a larger pool of talent (Chua et al., 2009) 
and therefore may have more outside experience and better training than family 
employees (Chirico, 2008; Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014). In addition, experienced 
non-family employees can act as mentors for future generations of family workers, 
preparing them to take control of the business (Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). 
 
At the same time, family employees have the potential to offer skills and services that are 
not easily imitated or acquired by non-family members (Dawson, 2012; Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999; Khanin, 2013). Research shows that family employees can develop their 
knowledge of the business at a very early age. They can be educated about the business 
at home, can participate in the family firm through summer jobs (Memili, Chrisman, 
Chua, Chang, & Kellermanns, 2011), and can join in “at-the-dinner-table” business 
conversations (Denison, Lief, & Ward, 2004, p. 64). As a result, family employees have 
the potential to acquire deep tacit knowledge of the firm, a kind of knowledge that is not 
easily transferred to non-family employees either through education or through training 
activities (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011). Thus, family employees can 
develop an innate understanding of the business, its processes, customers, and 
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competitors (Dyer, 1986). In turn, this may enable family employees to build and 
maintain trust-based, long-term relationships with customers and suppliers. Moreover, 
due to their emotional attachment and identification with the business, family employees 
can display a lower rate of absenteeism (Block et al., 2015) and may be willing to put 
extra effort, work, and time into the business without additional pay (Danes, Stafford, 
Haynes, & Amarapurkar, 2009). Moreover, the emotional attachment and identification 
that family employees have toward the business can lead them to have higher job 
satisfaction (Block et al., 2015) and a stronger alignment of interest with the organization 
(Sharma & Irving, 2005). All these elements allow family employees potentially to be 
more motivated and committed to the family business (Dawson, 2012). Given all of these 
elements discussed in the literature, it is debatable whether non-family employees are 
always eligible for superior or equal rewards compared to their family counterparts, and 
at least calls into question whether they can be judged by the same criteria. 
 
Yet, while family and non-family employees have the opportunity to offer different 
valuable contributions to the firm, it is also true that family employees do not always 
show these positive behaviors (Chua et al., 2009; Khanin, 2013; Kidwell et al., 2013) and, 
conversely, that non-family employees are not always better qualified than family 
employees (Dawson, 2012; Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Family and non-family 
employees have the potential to offer unique sets of knowledge, abilities, skills, and 
services (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Ideally, both family and non-family employees 
exercise these positive attributes, but their willingness to do so is less known (Dawson, 
2012; Kidwell et al., 2013). At any rate, how can fairness be achieved if only some of the 
individuals from each group practice their idiosyncratic skills and services in the 
business? To manage these two types of human capital in this complex situation we 
suggest that, to promote fairness, a starting point would be for family business decision 
makers to practice a mix of equality and equity inside the family business workplace. 
 
2.4 Equity and equality 
Equity and equality are two different concepts related to fairness. Equality means leveling 
or minimizing disparities between people regardless of their contributions (Cohen, 1987). 
Equity, by contrast, deals with the achievement of fairness through allocations that 
correspond with the contributions that individuals provide (Utting, 2007). Equality 
simply involves an objective assessment, by which all individuals receive the same 
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treatment. Equity, however, mixes this assessment with a judgement of individuals’ 
contributions, which bypasses the simplicity of treating all people equally 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1973). Such a “contribution view to fairness” would say that “a 
worker's just share of the resulting revenues [generated by the firm’s activity] is the 
amount that he or she contributes to production” (Boatright, 2010, p. 172). However, in 
addition to the difficulty of isolating and measuring the link between contribution and 
revenues generated for each employee, especially in family businesses wherein family 
and non-family employee contributions are diverse and distinct, fairness in the workplace 
involves questions about respect, expectations, and commitment that need to be 
considered (Arnold & Bowie, 2003; Moriarty, 2014). At any rate, greater equity does not 
mean greater equality. On the contrary, greater equity may indicate greater inequality 
(Van der Heyden, Blondel, & Carlock, 2005). For example, if the family employee has 
tacit knowledge of the firm, puts more time and effort in the business, and is more 
motivated at work than his or her non-family counterpart, then providing privileged 
treatment for the family employee indicates more equity but less equality. Similarly, if 
the non-family employee has greater knowledge and experience, is less likely to consume 
company resources for private benefits, and offers a rational and logical opinion that 
cannot be obtained by the virtue of family employment, then providing privileged 
treatment for the non-family employee indicates more equity and less equality. At the 
same time, before fully promoting equity in the family business workplace, there should 
be some minimum level of equality to achieve fairness. In fact, all employees deserve to 
be treated in a decent and respectful way. There are some levels of human dignity that 
need to be preserved in any kind of organization to prevent discrimination or harassment 
due to, for example, gender, race, religious orientation, or family adherence.  
 
Although equality has been characterized by five main principles (Eckhoff, 1974), for the 
purpose of this article we view equality as providing equal opportunities for family and 
non-family employees. In fact, providing equal opportunities reflects an anti-
discriminatory philosophy that will ensure the preservation of human dignity and that 
equitable practices will reflect merit and desert accurately. 
 
Consequently, given the different nature of family and non-family employee knowledge, 
skills, and services, how can decision makers achieve equal opportunities and equity in 
the family firm workplace? For example, in Jones Food, how can family business 
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controlling owners decide who deserves to be seated in the top managerial positions? In 
the following, we build on Leventhal’s (1980) and Van der Heyden et al.’s (2005) 
discussion of a fair process to provide four steps and a prerequisite through which equal 
opportunities and equity can be mutually attained in the family business workplace. We 
suggest the fair process to be the path that guides family business decision makers to 
achieve fairness between family and non-family employees in the workplace through the 
application of practices that reflect respect for human dignity, merit, and desert. 
 
2.5 Toward a fair process in the family business 
The concept of a fair process was first introduced by Thibaut and Walker (1975), who 
showed that fairness in legal procedures led to higher individual satisfaction and 
compliance with the outcomes of a decision. Leventhal (1980) built on this work and 
asserted that fair process is equally relevant outside legal settings, suggesting six rules by 
which a decision could be judged as fair: 
 
1. Consistency of the procedure across persons and time; 
2. The suppression of bias by the decision maker; 
3. Accuracy of information by which the decision is made; 
4. Correctability, or the ability to revise the decision when it is perceived as unfair; 
5. Voice, which reflects the ability of all involved individuals to present their basic 
concerns with the decision made; and 
6. Ethicality, which reflects the standards of ethics and morality of the procedure 
 
In the context of family businesses, Van der Heyden et al. (2005) showed how applying 
a fair process for allocation of resources between family members not only ensures the 
presence of fairness but also minimizes conflicts between family members involved in 
the workplace. 
 
For the application of a fair process in the family business workplace, taking into account 
both family and non-family employee contributions, we suggest that commitment to 
fairness by family business decision makers is an important prerequisite toward attaining 
this goal. Although commitment to fairness is not included in the six rules suggested by 
Leventhal (1980), we suggest that it is indispensable insofar as it implies that the family 
believes in fairness, desires its application, and considers it as a relative concept that must 
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be constantly aimed for (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). As such, commitment to fairness 
indicates that the principles we discuss in the next steps will not only be claimed (i.e., 
these principles will be simply written in the code of ethics), but will also be properly 
implemented and executed (Van der Heyden et al., 2005). In contrast to Van der Heyden 
et al. (2005), we understand commitment to fairness to be a prerequisite rather than a final 
step because, when dealing with family and non-family employees, family controlling 
owners are often prone to discriminate against non-family employees (e.g., Chua et al., 
2009; Covin, 1994; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Hence, it is 
essential for family business controlling owners to have some level of self-control 
(Lubatkin, Ling, & Schulze, 2007) that can lead them to implement and execute the steps 
leading to fairness effectively. Self-control refers to the ability of family business 
controlling owners to refrain from providing privileged treatment to a family member 
solely on the basis of family loyalty. It implies a willingness from the family business 
decision maker to adopt steps that will ultimately lead to fairness in the workplace 
(Lubatkin et al., 2007). Once the family is committed to fairness, there are four key steps 
that will help the family business to achieve fairness in its workplace. These steps have 
to do with giving equal opportunities for family and non-family employees and with 
achieving equity between all family business employees. Giving equal opportunities for 
family and non-family employees can be very problematic. For example, it might be 
almost impossible for family business controlling owners and human resources managers 
to give the opportunity for non-family employees to acquire the deep tacit firm knowledge 
that family employees have developed as a result of their early involvement in the 
business and their participation in at-the-dinner-table business conversations (Denison et 
al., 2004; Memili et al., 2011; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Given this situation, a minimum 
level of equal opportunities must be met through different steps and procedures. Table 1 
summarizes the steps by which a family firm can aim toward achieving fairness in its 
workplace. 
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Table 1. A fair process in the family business 
 
 
First, equal opportunities for family business employees can be achieved by clearly 
specifying the expectations for all family business employees that—when met—warrant 
privileged treatment (Leventhal, 1980; Van der Heyden et al., 2005). Family business 
decision makers and human resources managers need to highlight clearly what 
qualifications, services, and practices will qualify family business employees for 
privileged treatment. Does the company place higher value on outside experience or on 
early involvement in the business? Does the company reward spending extra time in the 
workplace by authorizing a flexible work schedule? These expectations must reflect the 
specific needs of the family firm by taking into consideration the environment in which 
Steps Description Course of Action Responsible for 
Application 
Pre-Requisite Family business 
decision makers must 
be committed to 
fairness. 
The family is 
committed to 
implement and 
execute fair practices 
in the business 
workplace. 
Family business 
owners, decision 
makers, or advisors. 
Step One Clearly explaining the 
expectations for 
entitlement.  
The expectations for 
entitlement must be 
clearly specified to all 
employees before 
signing the 
employment contract.  
Family business 
decision makers, 
human resources 
manager, or human 
resources employees.  
Step Two Giving equal 
opportunities to have a 
voice. 
Family business 
employees must know, 
before their first day at 
work, that they can 
freely and safely 
discuss their concerns 
with perceived unfair 
decisions. 
Family business 
decision makers, 
human resources 
manager, or human 
resources employees. 
Step Three Considering the 
correctability of the 
unfair decision. 
A committee can meet 
monthly to consider 
the correction of the 
alleged unfair decision 
voiced by the family 
or non-family 
employee. 
Committee that can be 
composed by a 
representative of family 
business employees, the 
human resources 
manager, and a family 
owner. 
Step Four Consistently applying 
decisions across people 
and over time. 
Decisions must be free 
of bias and 
consistently be applied 
to all employees. 
 
Family business 
decision maker, human 
resources manager, or 
family business 
advisors. 
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the family business operates. For example, training, education, and outside experience 
are essential prerequisites in environments characterized by high technological intensity 
or managerial complexity. In these environments, the presence of a skilled, educated, and 
experienced workforce will be an imperative need for the survival and success of a family 
business (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Conversely, when business exchanges are done 
recurrently with the same partners and necessitate trust-based relationships, the presence 
of a workforce that has built a healthy rapport with exchange partners will be more 
valuable. These expectations should be specified clearly to all family business employees 
before signing their employment contract and before starting their first day at work. 
 
Second, family and non-family employees must be given equal opportunities to voice 
their concerns with the decisions made. In fact, the ability to have a voice has been 
considered as a fundamental component reinforcing fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
Giving voice ensures that the views and concerns of both family and non-family 
employees are discussed and allows for greater clarity of information. Giving voice can 
be achieved through making family business employees know, before their first day at 
work, that they can freely and safely discuss their opinions about the decisions made with 
family business decision makers or human resources managers. 
 
Yet, giving voice alone loses its impact if it is not accompanied with a third key principle: 
correctability. In fact, if parties are given equal opportunities to voice their concerns with 
the decisions made but no action is taken to alter an unfair situation, then giving voice 
loses its impact. At this stage, the unfair situation alleged by family business employees 
must be examined by mixing a quantitative assessment with a moral and ethical 
judgement to decide whether the decision is unfair and needs to be corrected. 
Correctability of a decision can be decided by a committee that will examine whether the 
case voiced by the family or non-family employee is unfair. This committee can be 
composed of, for example, a representative of family business employees, the human 
resources manager, and a family business owner. This committee can meet monthly to 
discuss all the alleged unfair practices that are claimed by family business employees and 
to correct unfair decisions. 
 
Once those principles are applied in the family firm workplace, the fourth key step to 
achieve fairness is the consistent application of decisions across people, over time, and 
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with agreed values and norms (Leventhal, 1980; Van der Heyden et al., 2005). 
Consistently applying decisions based on values and norms reflecting fairness, clarity of 
information, voice, and correctability supports the ethicality of decisions made as well as 
the suppression of bias in decision making (Van der Heyden et al., 2005). 
Hence, if both family and non-family employees are showing positive behaviors in the 
business, but either party feels that they are not being fairly rewarded, then clearly 
highlighting the standards for entitlement in the company, giving family business 
employees a voice, considering the correctability of unfair situations, and consistently 
applying norms and values reflecting fairness across people and time will result in the 
achievement of fairness in the family business workplace. 
 
Our initial question was: How can family firms achieve fairness between family and non-
family employees? In this regard, we have offered four steps and a prerequisite that can 
guide practitioners and researchers to answer this question. To follow, we discuss our 
second question: Why should family business decision makers and advisors promote fair 
practices in the family business workplace? 
 
2.6 Consequences of unfair practices on family business reputation 
Because of their concern with maintaining the good reputation of the family firm 
(Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007), family business controlling owners constantly try to show that they 
practice socially responsible behavior in the workplace (Marques, Presas, & Simon, 2014; 
Zientara, 2015). In fact, the controlling owners of the majority of firms with family 
influence rank social responsibility in the workplace as the first social concern of their 
company (Marques et al., 2014). In their qualitative study, Marques et al. (2014, p. 9) 
quoted one family manager as saying: “The most important asset for a firm is its human 
capital. We look for the participation and well-being of our employees.” Moreover, 
family firms invest in their staff training, offer broad jobs and responsibilities for their 
employees (Danco, 1975), and encourage their employees’ innovative work involvement 
(Bammens, Notelaers, & Van Gils, 2015) in an attempt to preserve a good image and to 
be perceived as socially responsible in the workplace (Zientara, 2015). 
 
At the same time, unfair workplace practices can place the family business at risk of being 
perceived as socially irresponsible (Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2015). In fact, companies 
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can be both socially responsible and irresponsible (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006). While 
social responsibility is related to what managers should do, social irresponsibility looks 
at the problem of what managers should not do. At its extreme, social irresponsibility can 
entail breaking the law and engaging in fraudulent behavior (e.g., the cases of Enron and 
WorldCom). In the context of family businesses, although unfair workplace practices 
(e.g., providing leadership opportunities for unqualified family members) are not 
considered illegal, they are considered irresponsible social practices (Cruz et al., 2014; 
Zientara, 2015). These practices can be detrimental for the family business reputation, 
especially given today’s open access to social media. Be it electronically or through day-
to-day word of mouth, irresponsible behavior caused by unfair practices in the family 
business workplace will not remain unnoticed (Zientara, 2015). Therefore, due to the 
family’s concern with preserving its SEW, particularly the desire to protect the family 
reputation, family firms have incentives to promote fairness in the family business 
workplace. 
 
As previously discussed, contrary to some hasty reactions, promoting fairness in the 
family business workplace does not entail equal treatment of family and non-family 
employees regardless of their contributions. Rather, equal opportunities and equitable 
practices should both be present to achieve fairness in the workplace. When family 
businesses implement fair practices properly, the family is not only able to protect its 
reputation but is also able to gain advantages in terms of long-term survival and 
performance. 
 
2.7 Consequences of fair and unfair practices on family business performance 
We started this article by highlighting many examples in which family firms offered 
privileged treatment for family employees. Indeed, the consequences of these actions are 
highly contingent on whether the privileged treatment of family members is based on 
merit and desert or on family partiality and bias. 
 
At Jones Food, family managers were less competent than their non-family subordinates. 
Accordingly, non-family employees were dissatisfied with the lack of access to 
managerial positions and one non-family employee branched out and started a 
competitive business. Consequently, the Jones family was forced to sell off the company 
because of incompetent leadership, increased competition, and a lack of employee 
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motivation (Schein, 1999). At Lazard LLC, the unfair disparity in compensation favoring 
family employees led experienced and qualified non-family employees to form turnover 
intentions (Khanin, 2013) and leave the company, resulting in a major loss of managerial 
talent and a drop in profitability (Subramanian & Sherman, 2007). These cases are 
reflected accurately in academic argumentation. Kidwell et al. (2013) argued that the 
preferential treatment of an unqualified family employee can lead to negative family firm 
outcomes. Moreover, Chrisman et al. (2014) contended that family firms that constantly 
offer preferential treatment for unqualified family members will have a limited ability to 
attract qualified non-family employees to work in the business, which can lead to 
detrimental effects on long-term family business performance. 
 
However, when the privileged treatment of family employees is based on the application 
of fair practices, the family business is able to achieve a competitive advantage and, 
consequently, better performance. At Magid Glove, family employees are required to 
have outside experience before joining the family business. In addition, family employees 
are willing to spend extra time in the workplace without additional pay. This is why 
Magid Glove—despite its provision of flexible work schedules exclusively to family 
employees—is able to retain its non-family managerial talent and, consequently, to 
remain competent as a world leader in industrial safety equipment (Ward & Perricelli, 
2005). At HOLDAL Group, the exclusive presence of family members on the board of 
directors serves the company well and does not reflect a lack of fair practices in the 
workplace. Similarly, the presence of family members on the management team does not 
reflect a lack of fairness. In fact, at HOLDAL Group the opportunities for promotion are 
based on the abilities and the quality of the employees’ work. Moreover, one of the main 
core values of HOLDAL Group is listening to employees and giving and receiving 
feedback from them1. Accordingly, the exclusive presence of family members on the 
board and the presence of family members in the management team does not reflect a 
desire to pursue non-meritocratic unfair practices. In fact, family members involved in 
HOLDAL Group were involved early in the business, acquired deep tacit firm 
knowledge, and some of them had outside work experience before joining the company 
(Noronha, 2016). This is perhaps one of the main reasons that HOLDAL Group has, for 
the second consecutive year, been named as one of the top 100 companies in the Middle 
East (Forbes Middle East, 2014). In addition, this case accurately reflects recent research 
that suggests that nepotism (owner and manager preference to hire family members) is 
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not always problematic and bad for the company. Rather, when the preference for family 
members’ employment and promotion takes into account merit and desert this can 
significantly contribute to the firm’s ability to acquire, transfer, derive utility from, and 
protect tacit knowledge within the firm. In turn, the meritocratic appointment of family 
members in the management team and in the board of directors will contribute to 
improving the competitive advantage of the family firm (Dawson, 2012; Jaskiewicz, 
Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013; Khanin, 2013). 
 
2.8 Lessons learned 
How and why should fairness be practiced in the workplace of family firms? We suggest 
that since family and non-family employees have different attributes, the privileged 
treatment of family or non-family employees does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
fairness in the family firm. In this regard, we built on Leventhal (1980) and Van der 
Heyden et al.’s (2005) discussion of a fair process to propose four steps and a prerequisite 
(see Table 1) that can help to promote fairness in the distinctive context of the family 
business workplace. While Van der Heyden et al. (2005) centered on the fair process as 
a means of achieving justice between members of the same family, we extend their 
discussion by arguing that a fair process, with the modifications that we propose, can be 
equally relevant to cope with the messy and complicated situation family firms face in 
achieving fairness between family and non-family employees. 
Accordingly, we suggest that the essential question that needs to be addressed by family 
business owners, advisors, and researchers in order to answer appropriately whether 
fairness is present in the family business workplace: Does the family firm offer equal 
opportunities and exercise equitable practices in its workplace? In this regard, the 
presence of the steps that we propose (see Table 1) may be a good starting point for family 
business owners, decision makers, and advisors to evaluate whether fairness is practiced 
in the family business workplace. 
 
As we have shown, the privileged treatment of a family employee can be considered as a 
double-edged sword. If this privileged treatment takes into account merit and desert, it 
can contribute to better family business outcomes (e.g., the cases of Magid Glove and 
HOLDAL Group). However, if the privileged treatment of the family employee is based 
on unfair practices that are caused by family partiality and bias, it can lead to negative 
effects on the attitudes of all family business employees and, consequently, to detrimental 
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effects on the family business reputation, image, long-term performance, and survival 
(e.g., the cases of Jones Food and Lazard LLC). 
 
To conclude, the steps that we suggest can be used by family business owners and 
advisors to cope with the complex nature of their human capital and to ensure that the 
privileged treatment of family or non-family employees is based on fair standards. Family 
business owners, managers, advisors, and researchers can use the steps presented to 
investigate, evaluate, and ameliorate fair practices in the family business workplace. 
Achieving fair practices in the workplace should be a central concern for family 
businesses, especially since the presence of fairness is crucial for business reputation, 
profitability, and long-term survival—and thus on the ability of the family to preserve its 
socioemotional wealth (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012;Cruz et al., 
2014; Vallejo, 2009; Zientara, 2015). 
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Despite that family businesses are a group of heterogeneous companies with different 
levels of family involvement in the business, research has given little attention to these 
important contingencies when discussing family business environmental social 
performance. Building on the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) framework and using 
qualitative comparative analysis, we explore optimal configurations of governance 
antecedents that can catalyze the environmental social performance of family firms across 
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on the board. Specific configurations for non-Anglo-Saxon countries are also identified. 
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Increased toxic emissions, climate change, nutrition security, and the provision of 
healthcare to an increasing worldwide population are few examples of the social 
challenges that the global world is facing (World Economic Forum, 2016). Given their 
dominant worldwide presence (La Porta et al., 1999) and their substantial contribution to 
the world economy (Morck and Yeung, 2003), family firms are perhaps the most 
influential organizational form with the potential to assist governments and social welfare 
institutions to address the social challenges that the world is facing (Van Gils et al., 2014). 
  
In this context, research around the role of the family as an internal stakeholder capable 
of affecting the firm’s environmental social performance (e.g. Aragón Amonarriz, 
Iturrioz Landart, 2016; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Kim et al., 2016; Zellweger and Nason, 
2008) has increased over the last decade (Vazquez, 2016). Yet, comparative research on 
family versus non-family firms environmental social performance has produced 
competing arguments and mixed results (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Campopiano et al., 
2014; Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Feliu and Botero, 2016; Morck and Yeung, 
2004; Uhlaner et al., 2014). As nicely expressed by Le Breton Miller and Miller (2016, 
p:1;2) “for every story of a well-run and socially responsible family firm, there also exist 
tales of incompetence, family feuds, opportunism and even corporate malfeasance”. The 
salience of competing arguments and contradictory evidence suggests that family 
businesses are a group of heterogeneous companies and that they may sometimes, but not 
always, be socially performant.  
 
Studies have emphasized different sources for family business heterogeneity such as the 
founder’s involvement (Bingham et al., 2011), the generational ownership stage (Déniz 
and Cabrera, 2005), family values (Marques et al., 2014), and the personal characteristics 
of managers (Niehm, Swinney, and Miller, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, research 
has yet to consider how the combination of different levels of family involvement in the 
company can jointly shape the environmental social performance of family firms. This is 
surprising given recent evidence that shows that different combinations of family 
business governance contingencies can act in complementarity yielding different family 
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business outcomes (Déniz and Cabrera, 2005; Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014; 
Marques et al., 2014). For example, qualitative evidence suggests that absolute family 
ownership of the business, when combined with high family involvement in management, 
can lead the family to have higher identification with the business and higher commitment 
to socially responsible practices (Marques et al., 2014). To address this important gap in 
the literature, we build on several firm governance contingencies (i.e. family involvement 
in ownership, family involvement in management, and board composition) introduced by 
Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2016) to explore the following question: What are the 
optimal governance configurations that can drive forward the family business 
environmental social performance?  
 
To that aim, we will first ground our analysis in the theoretical views of Socio-Emotional 
Wealth (SEW) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Given that the main reference point that 
family firms use to make decisions is the preservation of their SEW (e.g. Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012), we focus on environmental social performance as it 
relates to a strong family identification with the business (Marques et al., 2014; Sharma 
and Sharma, 2011), to the family reputation (Cennamo et al., 2012), and to the desire to 
keep the family dynasty and reign over the business across generations (Kim et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, building on the work of Kellermanns et al. (2012), we consider SEW as a 
double-edged sword that, depending on the combination of several governance 
contingencies, can either foster or constrain the ability of family businesses to increase 
their social performance. Second, we will use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA) on survey data provided by the Successful Transgenerational Entrepreneurship 
Project (STEP) to explore different configurations of governance structures that can 
catalyze the family business environmental social performance. The STEP database 
offers rich information about companies embedded in 35 different countries. This gives 
the opportunity to explore family business governance orientations across different legal 
systems (i.e. Anglo-Saxon versus non-Anglo-Saxon countries) and implications for 
environmental social performance.  
 
In so doing, we make four important contributions to the scant literature on this important 
topic. First, exploring different configurations of family business governance 
contingencies allows a better understanding of the mutual dependence factors in 
management and ownership along with governance choices that lead to better family firm 
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environmental social performance (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 2016; Nordqvist et al., 
2014). Second, we contribute to the debate on when and how SEW increases the 
environmental social performance of family firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et al., 
2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Kellermanns et al., 2012); thereby reconciling previous 
competing arguments and conflicting evidence found in the literature. Third, by exploring 
how different levels of family involvement in the business combine within varying 
configurations to affect the firm’s social performance, we heed calls for examining the 
interplay between different governance contingencies affecting the environmental social 
performance of family firms (Marques et al., 2014; Van Gils et al., 2014) across different 
legal settings and systems (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 2016). Fourth, this research alerts 
family business owners, advisors, and policy makers to the relevant combination of 
governance antecedents that can catalyze the environmental social performance of their 
firms.  
 
3.2 Environmental Social Performance of Family Firms 
Social performance is broadly defined as “a business organisation’s configuration of 
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, 
programs and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships” 
(Wood 1991, p. 693).  
 
Social performance constitutes a holistic model that comprises legal, ethical, and 
discretionary social actions that aim to increase the benefits that the organization offers 
to its environment and to reduce and alleviate the harms resulting from the firm´s 
activities (Wood, 2010). Corporate social responsibility and firm philanthropy constitute 
a subset of the holistic social performance model as they specifically relate to the 
voluntary actions taken by the company to improve the social state and wellbeing of its 
stakeholders (Bowen, 1953; Mackey et al., 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Freeman, 1984). 
 
In this paper, we focus on environmental social performance which is mostly used in the 
literature to investigate family firms’ social performance (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; 
Bingham et al., 2011; Craig and Dibrell, 2006; Cruz et al., 2014; Marques et al., 2014; 
Neubaum et al., 2012); allowing comparability and continuity with previous research. 
Environmental social performance is defined as the firm’s commitment to meeting and 
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exceeding societal expectations with respect to concerns about the environment in which 
the firm operates (Judge and Douglas, 1998). Environmental social performance refers to 
commitment to socially responsible behavior towards the environment at large; including 
the natural environment in which the company is embedded, the community (e.g. 
charitable donations), and the development of services and products through transparent 
and responsible procedures (Cruz et al., 2014). 
 
If SEW is the main reference point that explains the family business attitude towards its 
environment (Berrone et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Kellermanns et al., 2012; Zellweger et al., 2012), then the environmental social 
performance of family firms can be highly contingent upon whether the bright or the dark 
side of SEW is prevalent (Kellermanns et al., 2012). Decision makers can practice self-
serving behavior placing family needs above all other stakeholder claims (e.g. Cruz et al., 
2014; Kellermanns et al., 2012), which outlines a potentially dark side of SEW. 
Alternatively, decision makers can be concerned with the long-term reputation of the 
business and with preserving a healthy and prosperous environment in which the firm 
will continue to thrive (e.g. Marques et al., 2014; Berrone et al., 2010). This is the bright 
side of SEW. In the following, we outline the main elements of the SEW perspective 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) and we summarize arguments related to how different 
governance contingencies can shape the circumstances under which SEW can foster or 
restrict the willingness and ability of family firms to increase their environmental social 
performance. 
 
3.3 SEW 
Derived from the behavioral agency model (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), SEW 
represents “the stock of affect-related value that the family has invested in the firm” 
(Berrone et al., 2010, p. 82; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  Its main premise is that family 
members manage the business in a way to preserve and increase the social and economic 
benefits that the family gains from its involvement in the firm. As such, family decision 
makers may put the firm´s financial success at risk to preserve and/or increase their SEW 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
   
Berrone et al. (2012) decompose SEW into five dimensions: a desire for family influence 
and control, a close identification with the business, binding social ties, an emotional 
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attachment to the firm, and a desire for renewal of family bonds through dynastic 
succession. In the early stages of its development, SEW has been considered as a pro-
social stimulus that increases family firms social performance (Berrone et al., 2010, 2012; 
Cennamo et al., 2012). Recent works, however, show that SEW can be considered as a 
double-edged sword that can either reveal its bright or dark side (Cruz et al., 2014; 
Kellermanns et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2016). For example, due to the desire to preserve a 
good family image, family firms are less likely to greenwash and more likely to follow 
through on their proclaimed environmental commitments (Kim et al., 2016). At the same 
time, due to their concern with preserving the business financial stability and a sense of 
financial responsibility for preserving family wealth across generations’, family firms are 
less likely to invest in the protection of the environment; considering investments in 
environmental sustainability as a net cost (Kim et al., 2016). 
 
In the following, we draw on different governance contingencies that can act as a driver 
for the prevalence of the bright side of SEW and that can mitigate the consequences of 
its dark side. 
  
3.4 Governance Contingencies 
As previously argued, central to the SEW perspective is that family firms strive to pursue 
non-economic family-centred goals (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012). 
Chrisman et al. (2012) show that the percentage of family involvement in ownership and 
management of the firm is positively associated to the desire of the family to pursue non-
economic goals. At the same time, research shows that there might be eight different 
configurations of family involvement in ownership, management, and direction of the 
business (Garcia-Castro and Casassola, 2011), and that the combination of these 
contingencies may yield different family business outcomes (Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 
2014; Samara and Mirabent, 2017). In other words, each variable by itself can produce a 
“questionable” positive or negative net effect on the firm´s environmental social 
performance. Research shows that the effect of a specific contingency (e.g. absolute 
family ownership of the business) can change when combined with another contingency 
(e.g. high family involvement in management) (Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014; 
Marques et al., 2014; Samara and Berbegal-Mirabent, 2017). Building on these findings, 
we discuss competing arguments reflecting the bright and the dark side of different family 
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business governance structures that, in turn, can foster or restrain the ability of family 
firms to increase their environmental social performance. 
 
3.4.1 Absolute Family Ownership: The Bright and the Dark Side 
The Bright Side 
When the family owns 100% of the business, the likelihood that controlling owners will 
desire to transfer the business legacy to future generations will be high (Bingham et al., 
2011; Campopiano et al., 2014). Moreover, absolute family ownership implies that the 
family’s reputation will be closely associated to that of the firm (Campopiano et al., 2014; 
Bingham et al., 2011; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Lähdesmäki, 2012). Consequently, the 
family’s desire for inter-generation succession and for preserving a good family image 
will likely increase the firm´s social performance. For example, when the 100% family 
owned firm increases its environmental social performance, this will further bolster the 
good reputation of the family itself and can amplify the chances of the family to transfer 
a well-reputed and long-term oriented business to future generations (Dyer and Whetten, 
2006; Sharma and Sharma, 2011). Moreover, if the family shares business ownership 
with outsiders, this can distance the firm from family values, can decrease the association 
between the family reputation and the business reputation, and can catalyze a short-term 
orientation and a desire for short-term financial profits (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 
2016). Furthermore, the presence of institutional investors can be associated with a desire 
for short-term gains and for self-interested behavior (Wiklund, 2006) and can create a 
principal-principal conflict of interest between family owners and outsiders (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2004), which impedes effective decision making and limits available funds to 
invest in environmental friendly activities. Consequently, absolute family ownership can 
increase the family firm environmental social performance (Campopiano et al., 2014; Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016). 
 
The Dark Side 
At the same time, when the family owns 100% of business equity, it will have absolute 
power to pursue its non-economic family centred goals (Chrisman et al., 2012). 
Employment of family employees regardless of meritocratic considerations (Chrisman et 
al., 2014; Kidwell et al., 2013) and preserving financial resources within family hands at 
the expense of investments in the welfare of the environment (Kim et al., 2016) become 
easier to achieve. In other words, absolute family ownership grants the family the power 
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and the legitimacy to do whatever it takes to preserve its control over business resources. 
For example, Neubaum et al (2012) suggest that family ownership may free controlling 
owners from pressures to be responsive to stakeholders’ environmental demands. 
Moreover, recent evidence indicates that institutional investors can be dedicated owners 
that care about the long-term strategy of the company (Connelly et al., 2010). Dedicated 
institutional owners usually hold their equity stake for a longer period in a smaller number 
of firms (Porter, 1992); which makes them concerned with the long-term welfare of the 
environment in which the company is located. Hence, absolute family ownership of the 
business may decrease the incentives and limit the opportunities for family businesses to 
increase their environmental social performance.  
 
3.4.2 High Family Involvement in Management: The Bright and the Dark Side 
The Bright Side 
When family involvement in management is high, this will further strengthen the close 
emotional and reputational association that family employees have with the business, 
leading them to be more sensitive to the reputation of their firm (Bingham et al., 2011). 
High family involvement in management indicates that the family has sufficient power 
to influence the firm’s social performance (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016; Sharma 
and Sharma, 2011). Hence, family managers will have the willingness (i.e. emotional and 
reputational incentives) and the ability (i.e. managerial power) (De Massis et al., 2014) 
to lead the firm towards increasing its environmental social performance (Sharma and 
Sharma, 2011). Moreover, the presence of non-family executives can be associated with 
self-serving, short-term, rent seeking behaviors. Due to their ineligibility for succession, 
non-family executives may be tempted towards short-term financially driven priorities 
(Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016; Bingham et al., 2011), neglecting the needs of the 
natural environment in which the business operates (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016; 
James, 1999). Consequently, high family involvement in management can increase the 
family business environmental social performance. 
 
The Dark Side 
However, another view associates high family involvement in management with the 
presence of asymmetric family altruism (e.g. Kellermanns et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 
2001, 2003). This behavior may lead family members to act opportunistically where each 
family member involved in the business seeks to achieve her/his own self-interest and/or 
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his/her nuclear family interests (especially when latter generations become involved in 
the business); leading to increased conflicts and competing needs and claims in the family 
firm (Chirico and Bau, 2014). As more generations become involved in the business, 
struggles over influence and control can create relationship conflicts between family 
members who have equal power to pursue divergent goals (Chirico and Bau, 2014) and 
who will likely disagree on how and where resources should be invested (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2016). Consequently, these behaviors can restrict the ability of family 
businesses to pursue activities that promote the welfare of the social environment in 
which they operate (Campopiano et al., 2014; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016). In sum, 
high family involvement in management can indicate a lack of professionalism and can 
create distractions coming from intra-family conflict, which will eventually lead to a 
decrease in resources available to increase the environmental social performance of 
family firms (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016).  
 
3.4.3 Presence of Outside Directors on the Board: The Dark and the Bright Side 
Outside directors respond to either affiliates or independent directors. The main 
difference between them is that affiliates are people who have had a previous relationship 
with the family or the business. Independent directors, however, are people who have had 
no previous relationship with the family or the business. Instead, their association with 
the business begins with their directorship. Shareholders usually appoint independent 
directors on the board for their objectivity and impartial views, which allow them to 
provide a monitoring role, and service and advice to the company (Anderson and Reeb, 
2004; Bammens et al., 2011). Research shows that independent directors can act as a 
linking mechanism between the organization and its environment and can increase the 
business concern with answering the needs of other stakeholders (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2005). 
 
The Dark Side  
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) argue that family controlling owners are highly 
concerned with preserving their influence and control over business decisions. 
Consequently, family controlling owners will appoint outside directors on the board 
based on their family ties and personal connections; making the board dominated by 
affiliates and family members. Hence, family ownership reduces or even eliminates the 
board independence making it coerced to comply with family desires. This leads all 
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outside directors to be less independent, and reduces the board´s ability to monitor the 
management team and to offer idiosyncratic service and advice for the company 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Chen and Jaggi, 2001). In turn, a less independent 
board limits the capabilities (e.g. monitoring self-interest of family decision makers; 
reducing the principal-principal conflict of interest) and resources (e.g. additional service 
and advice that independent directors can bring) available in the family firm to increase 
its environmental social performance.  
 
The Bright Side 
The arguments Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) make start from the assumption that 
family ownership eliminates the independence of the family business board. However, 
family businesses are a group of heterogeneous companies and they may sometimes, but 
not always, appoint outside directors on the board due to their close relationship with the 
family. In other words, family firms are not always prone to make family control a priority 
and can appoint outside directors for their monitoring and advisory role.  In this regard, 
Lane et al (2006, p.154) argue: “independence is a mindset of disinterest that cannot be 
predicted by the lack of prior relationships of the parties involved”. Outside directors, 
regardless of whether they are affiliates or independent directors, can have an independent 
mind-set (Lane et al., 2006), can monitor self-serving behavior, and can contribute to the 
firm’s knowledge about opportunities where it can increase its environmental social 
performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016; Bammens 
et al., 2011). However, the presence of outside directors alone without any family 
presence on the board may divorce business owners from the realities facing their 
company. This undermines efficient allocations of resources and limits the family 
business ability to increase its environmental social performance (Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2016). Therefore, a mix of family and outside board members will be most 
efficient to increase the environmental social performance of family firms (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2016). 
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Proposition 
Based on the competing arguments outlined above, we use a configurational approach to 
examine the following proposition: 
 
The presence or absence of different levels of family involvement in ownership and 
management, and board composition combine into specific configurations leading to high 
family business environmental social performance.  
 
We move the discussion forward by exploring how the combination of the presence 
and/or absence of the previously outlined governance contingencies can, in 
complementarity, increase family firms’ environmental social performance. We do so by 
leveraging on the diversity of nationalities of companies present in the STEP project, 
therefore accounting for the legal system in which the companies are operating. We 
differentiate between Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon countries as they have been 
identified to be “two contrasting ideal-type national models of corporate governance” 
(Garcia-Castro et al., 2013, p.3). Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. U.K., Australia, and the 
U.S.A) have a strong shareholder value orientation, a deep stock market capitalization, a 
focus on the protection of outside investors, and usually link managers’ compensation to 
firm profitability (La Porta et al., 1999). Non-Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Spain, Greece, 
Germany, Mexico), by contrast, have a long-term stakeholder welfare orientation, have a 
smaller percentage of companies that have their total stock in free float, and are less likely 
to link managers’ compensation to firm profitability (Garcia-Castro et al., 2013).  In the 
closing sections, we show how the results coming from the configurational approach can 
be used to discuss under what conditions SEW is likely to reveal its bright side and 
increase the environmental social performance of family firms.   
 
3.5 Methodology  
3.5.1 Sample Description 
We use the STEP survey data for our empirical analysis. The STEP project was founded 
in 2005 by six leading schools with the aim to study how family businesses transmit 
entrepreneurial behavior throughout generations. Nowadays, the project includes more 
than 40 academic institutions around the world.  
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The STEP survey data was collected during the period of September 2013 to February 
2015 by universities located in North America, Latin America, Asia, and Europe. The 
STEP database offers rich information about family firms located in 35 countries. The 
survey adopts a multi-respondent methodology by which two members of the same 
participating family have been asked to complete the same survey. Professional 
translators have translated the survey into 13 languages. The survey was then sent by 
email to 4162 eligible participants. Out of the 4162 participants, 1344 completed the 
survey, resulting in a response rate of 32.2%. Moreover, 382 companies successfully had 
two respondents of the same family firm completing the survey; resulting in 764 total 
respondents. Out of the 382 companies, we included in our analysis 146 family firms 
where respondents indicated that the family firm has a board of directors and where both 
respondents provided full information about their perception of the family business 
environmental social performance. Table 1 shows the countries included in the study. 
 
Table 1: Countries included in the study 
 
Country Number of companies aAnglo-Saxon Country 
Belgium 1 No 
Canada 5 Yes 
Chile 9 No 
Colombia 9 No 
France 3 No 
Germany 1 No 
Hong Kong 8 No 
Ireland 10 Yes 
Italy 11 No 
Mexico 2 No 
Peru 3 No 
Puerto Rico 1 No 
Spain 16 No 
Sweden 13 No 
Switzerland 9 No 
U.K. 4 Yes 
U.S.A. 39 Yes 
Venezuela 2 No 
a Total Anglo-Saxon countries: 58. 
a Total non-Anglo-Saxon country: 88. 
 
To address potential selection bias problems, we have compared the sample of full 
responses to the sample that did not provide full information about our variables of 
interest. We performed non-response bias tests comparing the year founded, the location, 
and the perceived environmental social performance of family firms. We found no 
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statistically significant differences in the responses of the two groups, corroborating that 
non-response bias cannot be considered a problem in this study. 
 
3.5.2 Measures 
The outcome variable is the environmental social performance of family firms. Following 
Judge and Douglas (1998), the STEP survey measures environmental social performance 
of family firms using a 5-point Likert scale across four items: Complying with 
environmental regulations, Limiting environmental impact beyond compliance, 
Preventing and mitigating environmental crisis, and Educating employees and public 
about the environment. Participants were asked to rate their primary company 
performance to that of their closest competitors over the last 3 years. Answer choices 
range from “Much worse” to “Much better”. We then added individual scores across the 
four items to compute an overall environment social performance score. We computed 
the final environmental social performance score in two ways: 1) as the mean of the 
overall rating provided by the two respondents of the same company and 2) by keeping 
the score of the respondent that had more work experience in the company (in cases where 
the two respondents had similar work experience or where data about the work experience 
was missing, we selected the respondent that had the higher work position in the 
company).  
 
Consistent with the previous argumentation, we use three causal conditions as 
antecedents for higher environmental social performance. The first is family ownership, 
measured as the percentage of total equity owned by the same family. The second is 
family involvement in management, measured as the proportion of family members 
involved in the total top management team. The third is the presence of outside directors 
on the board, measured as the proportion of outside directors to total board members. We 
complement these causal conditions with two important control variables that may affect 
our results: The generation of the management team (first versus later generations) and 
the legal system in which the company operates (Anglo-Saxon versus non-Anglo-Saxon 
countries). Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the causal and the control variables 
used. 
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 Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the causal variables and control variables explored 
 
N 
 
Range 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Mean 
 
Totalfamowna 146 75 25 100 94.16 
Percnonfboardb 
146 1,00 ,00 1,00 ,3321 
Percentfammgmtc 
146 1,00 ,00 1,00 ,5203 
Anglcrspd 146 1 0 1 ,39 
Secondgenmane 146 1 0 1 ,22 
Valid N (listwise) 146     
a total family ownership of the business 
b Percentage of non-family members on the family business board 
c Percentage of family members in the top management team 
d Anglo-Saxon countries 
e Second versus later generation management team 
 
 
Analytical Technique 
Because the purpose of this study is to explore the combination of governance antecedents 
that affect the firms’ environmental social performance, we use fsQCA as our analytical 
technique. FsQCA is an increasingly popular method in management (e.g. Fiss, 2007, 
2011; Bell et al., 2014) and in family business research (e.g. Garcia-Castro and Casasola, 
2011; Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014, Kraus et al., 2016; Samara and Berbegal-
Mirabent, 2017) that allows us to investigate different combinations of causal conditions 
leading to a certain outcome (Ragin, 2008).  
 
FsQCA uses Boolean algebra to compare cases in relation to a specific outcome (i.e. the 
dependent variable). Accordingly, fsQCA offers different advantages over traditional 
statistical regression analysis. First, by assuming asymmetrical relationships among 
variables, fsQCA is able to overcome limitations coming from linearity and 
complementarity of associations between variables. In other words, rather than assuming 
each causal condition as analytically distinct, fsQCA assumes causal complexity and 
allows to investigate the effect of the combination of different antecedent causal 
conditions (either their presence or absence) on the outcome (Longest and Vaisey, 2008; 
Roig-Tierno et al., 2016). For example, rather than examining whether high family 
involvement in management produces a net effect on the social performance of family 
firms while controlling for family involvement in ownership and board composition, 
fsQCA examines how these variables combine within configurations to affect the social 
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performance of family firms. Second, fsQCA is based on equifinality; meaning that it 
allows to have more than one combination of antecedent causal conditions that explain 
the outcome (Fiss, 2007). In other words, equifinality acknowledges the possibility of 
existence of heterogeneous pathways to achieve the same outcome (i.e. high 
environmental social performance). Relatedly, the configurational approach may be more 
robust than regression based models, as it is not sensitive to outliers. Rather, the 
configurational approach identifies outliers and displays their coverage and consistency 
values as part of the equifinality of solutions (Pappas et al., 2016). Last, fsQCA is not 
sensitive to sample size and is able to perform well with large and small samples (Fiss, 
2011).  
 
Although the configurational analysis provides several advantages, it has also some 
limitations that we acknowledge. First, using fuzzy methods does not enable researchers 
to isolate the effect of a unique variable on a certain outcome. However, because the aim 
of the research is to identify the combination of optimal levels of family involvement in 
the business leading to increased environmental social performance, the unique effects of 
a variable do not fall under the main objectives of this paper. Perhaps the most important 
limitation is that fsQCA does not test for the validity and reliability of the variables of 
interest. Therefore, following the recommendation of Pappas et al. (2016), we first test 
the construct validity of the measure of environmental social performance. Using 
XLSTAT software, we perform confirmatory factor analysis (maximum likelihood 
estimation) with Kendall correlation analysis as a basis to conduct the maximum 
likelihood procedure (because the data is ordinal with a restricted range of categories) to 
test the construct validity of the environmental social performance. Table 3 shows 
summary statistics about the underlying variables forming the environmental social 
performance construct.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables constituting environmental social 
performance 
 
Variable 
Observations 
Obs. with 
missing data 
Obs. without 
missing data Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Complyenva 146 146 1,000 5,000 3,667 0,939 
Limitenvimpb 146 146 2,000 5,000 3,769 0,820 
Mitigatenvcri
sic 146 146 2,000 5,000 3,558 0,741 
Enveducation
d 146 146 2,000 5,000 3,531 0,779 
a Complying with environmental regulations,  
b Limiting environmental impact beyond compliance,  
c Preventing and mitigating environmental crisis,  
d Educating employees and public about the environment 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.706). This indicates that common variance is not a major problem and that 
our data is suitable to perform confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
 Table 4: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 
 
Table 5 shows the result of the goodness of fit test. As the p-value of the Chi-square test 
is higher than 0.05, this indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that one factor is 
enough to describe the data. The risk to reject this hypothesis while it is true is 11.09%. 
Therefore, we conclude that the environmental social performance shows acceptable 
scores for construct validity.   
 
Table 5. Goodness of fit test 
Chi-square (Observed value) 4,399 
Chi-square (Critical value) 5,991 
DF 2 
p-value 0,111 
Alpha 0,05 
 
Complyenv 0,720 
Limitenvimp 0,798   
Mitigatenvcrisi 0,652   
Enveducation 0,697   
KMO 0,706 
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After determining the validity of the environmental social performance construct, we 
move forward to discuss its reliability. Regarding internal reliability, this construct shows 
acceptable scores with a Cronbach’s Alfa of 0.753. The inter-rater reliability of this 
measure was 0.675. Because the inter-rater reliability is relatively low, we consider in our 
analysis the score of the respondent that has the higher work experience in the company. 
 
FsQCA requires expressing variables into sets and sub-sets according to their degree of 
membership to a specific condition. Developed by Ragin (2008), the fsQCA software 
allows to transform values into crisp and fuzzy terms and to conduct the empirical 
analysis. Scores in crisp sets are operationalized as dummy variables that take the value 
of “1” (presence of the variable) or “0” (absence of the variable). Scores in fuzzy sets 
range from “1” (full membership) to “0” (full non-membership). Cut-off points allow 
calibrating all values into membership values. Table 6 shows and explains the way 
variables have been calibrated.  
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Table 6. Variable definition and calibration values 
Condition Description 
Membership threshold  
Full non-
membershi
p 
 
Crossover 
point 
Full 
membership 
 
Environmental 
social 
performancea 
The overall score for environmental 
social performance  
10.5 
(0.01) 
14 
(0.5) 
18 
(0.95) 
Family 
ownershipb 
Percentage of the business equity held 
by the family group (100%=1; 
<100%=0) 
0  1 
Family 
involvement in 
the top 
management 
teama 
Calculated as the ratio of family top 
managers to the total top management 
team 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.5) 
1 
(0.95) 
Presence of mix 
of outside 
directors and 
family directorsc 
Percentage of presence of outside 
directors’ relative to total board seats   
0 
(0.01) 
0.3 
(0.5) 
0.6 
(0.8) 
Anglo-Saxon 
countriesb 
Anglo-Saxon versus non-Anglo-
Saxon countries 0  1 
First generation 
managersb 
Whether the top management team 
includes first generation managers or 
later generations 
0  1 
a To maximize our ability of differentiating between the most socially performant companies, 
observations falling in the percentile-95 are considered to represent full set membership. Percentile-0.01 
is the threshold value for indicating full non-membership. The crossover point is defined by the median 
(0.5). 
b Variables expressed in crisp-set terms. We operationalized family ownership as a crisp set as 73,28% of 
the companies had 100% family ownership and 26.72% had less than 100% family ownership.  
c We choose 0.8 instead of 0.95 as the threshold for full membership as it enables us to account for the 
mix between outside directors and family members on the board (0.6) rather than measuring a board 
dominated by outsiders.  
 
After calibrating values, the building and analysis of the truth table constitutes the next 
step. The table has as many rows as logically possible combinations of conditions (Fiss, 
2011). FsQCA uses Boolean algebra to compute the commonalities among the 
configurations that lead to the outcome. With fsQCA the Quine-McCluskey algorithm 
performs the logical reduction of statements (Fiss, 2007). Two parameters indicate the 
goodness of fit of the final solution: coverage and consistency. Coverage expresses the 
empirical relevance of the solution found and is analogous to the effect size in statistical 
hypothesis testing, while consistency quantifies the extent to which cases sharing similar 
conditions present the same outcome and is analogous to significance metrics in statistical 
hypothesis testing (Kraus et al., 2016; Woodside and Zhang, 2012). 
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3.5.3 Results 
Because fsQCA assumes causal complexity and asymmetrical relationships, the first step 
is to analyze whether the absence or presence of each causal condition is, by itself, 
necessary to produce the outcome (Meyer et al., 1993). A condition is considered as 
necessary when its consistency value is equal to, or exceeds 0.9 (Schneider & 
Wangemann., 2010). Table 7 displays the consistency and coverage values for all 
antecedent causal conditions related to environmental social performance. Since the 
highest consistency value among all causal conditions is 0.7263, this means that none of 
the variables alone can be considered as a necessary condition to produce the outcome. 
 
Table 7. Analysis of necessary conditions for high environmental social 
performance Conditions tested* Consistency Coverage family ownership 0.7263 0.4869 ~family ownership 0.2736 0.5708 proportion of family managers in the top management team 0.6006 0.5817 ~ proportion of family managers in the top management team 0.6597 0.7029 Mix between outside directors and family directors on the board 0.6705 0.6628 ~ Mix between outside directors and family directors on the board 0.5248 0.5470 First generation managers in the management team 0.5012 0.5227 ~ First generation managers in the management team 0.4987 0.4927 Anglo-Saxon Countries 0.3687 0.4774 ~ Anglo-Saxon Countries 0.6312 0.5266 
                                * The symbol (~) represents the negation of the characteristic. 
 
Table 8 displays the results of the intermediate solution for environmental social 
performance, as recommended by Ragin’s (2009). Using the notation introduced by 
Ragin & Fiss (2008), black circles () denote the presence of a condition, white circles 
(⭕) represent its absence, and blank cells indicate that the condition is not binding in that 
particular configuration. 
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Table 8. Antecedent governance contingencies for high environmental social 
performance 
  Frequency Cutoff: 1.0000 
  Consistency Cut-off: 0.7509 
 
We found five causal combinations for high environmental social performance, therefore 
validating the initial proposition that different combinations of governance contingencies 
can increase the family business environmental social performance. Table 8 reveals that 
the solution consistency is 0.8197 which is above the solution consistency cut-off and 
which meets the recommendation of Ragin (2008). The solution consistency indicates 
that these different causal conditions are sufficient for the family firm to show high 
environmental social performance. Moreover, the solution coverage equals 0.3875, which 
indicates that the extracted causal recipes explain an acceptable proportion of variation in 
environmental social performance of family firms and is similar or higher than coverage 
values found in previous research (e.g. Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2013; Garcia-Castro 
et al., 2013; Kraus et al., 2016). 
 
Configuration no. 
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Consistency 
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1  ⭕ ⭕   0.0757 0.0466 0.9211 
2      0.06887 0.0064 0.7932 
3     ⭕ 0.2378 
0.1051 
0.8001 
4 ⭕    ⭕ 0.1559 0.0766 0.8060 
5 ⭕    ⭕ 0.0266 0.0111 0.8717 
 Solution coverage: 0.3875 
Solution consistency: 0.8197 
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Two further robustness checks were performed. We first replaced absolute family 
ownership by 90% family ownership or higher. Second, we changed the calibration of the 
presence of outside directors to capture a higher involvement of outside members on the 
board. As can be seen in table 9 and 10, the majority of configurations that show 
acceptable coverage and consistency scores are congruent with the main configurations 
found in table 9. Moreover, when we replace 100% family ownership by 90% ownership, 
the overall solution coverage drops to 0.30. We therefore conclude that the outcome is 
better modelled when considering family firms that desire to keep business ownership 
exclusively within family hands.  
 
Table 9. Robustness check by replacing absolute family ownership with 90% family 
ownership 
Frequency Cutoff: 1.0000 
Consistency Cut-off: 0.8001 
 
 
 
 
 
Configuration no. Antecedent conditions Raw Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
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1  ⭕ ⭕   0.0814 0.0719 0.9262 
2      0.02174 0.0123 0.8024 
3    ⭕ ⭕ 0.1689 0.1238 0.8024 
4 ⭕ ⭕   ⭕ 0.0180 0.0118 1.0000 
5 ⭕    ⭕ 0.0266 0.0111 0.8717 
 
Solution coverage: 0.3085 
Solution consistency: 0.8542 
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Table 10. Robustness check by changing the calibration of outside board directors 
Frequency Cutoff: 1.0000 
Consistency Cut-off: 0.7517 
 
3.6 Discussion 
We started this paper by highlighting that competing arguments and conflicting results 
are associated with the comparison of family and non-family firms’ environmental social 
performance. Accordingly, because family businesses are a group of heterogeneous 
companies, we set to explore optimal combinations of governance antecedents that can 
catalyze the family firm environmental social performance. Specifically, our empirical 
findings show that different levels of family involvement in ownership and management, 
and the board composition combine into configurations to increase the family firm 
environmental social performance. Therefore, we make theoretical and practical 
contributions to this important topic by identifying specific boundary conditions under 
which SEW reveals its bright side and increases the family business social performance. 
 
We identify five different causal paths that lead to increased family firm environmental 
social performance. The first two causal paths apply to all family businesses and the last 
three causal recipes apply specifically to non-Anglo-Saxon countries. Configuration #1 
indicates that SEW reveals its bright side when the family owns 100% of the business, 
when first generation managers are still involved in the management team, when the 
Configuration no. Antecedent conditions Raw Coverage 
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1  ⭕ ⭕   0.0868 0.0422 0.9238 
2 ⭕ ⭕  ⭕  0.1389 0.0444 0.8298 
3     ⭕ 0.2374 0.1282 0.8218 
4 ⭕    ⭕ 0.1513 0.0145 0.8479 
5 ⭕    ⭕ 0.0266 0.0111 0.8717 
6      0.0334 0.0186 0.7798 
 
Solution coverage: 0.4406 
Solution consistency: 0.8254 
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board is dominated by family members, and when there is high involvement of non-family 
executives in the management team. The presence of non-family executives in the 
management team indicates that the family´s concern with preserving its influence and 
control is tempered by a desire for professionalism. In other words, the desire to preserve 
SEW does not manifest itself in random employment and privileged treatment of family 
members regardless of meritocratic principles. First generation family business leaders 
have a close identification with the business and are more likely concerned with 
transferring a long-term oriented well-reputed business to future generations. This leads 
them to apply meritocratic criteria when deciding whom to appoint on the management 
team. Under these circumstances, family members may be better suited to sit on the 
family business board than outside directors (Samara and Arenas, 2017). Family directors 
that are primarily concerned with the business long-term survival may have a better 
understanding of family dynamics (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Ollala, 2011) which 
facilitates decision making on the board and increases the capability of the family 
business to increase its social performance.  
 
However, as configuration #2 suggests, when first generation family members tend to 
employ exclusively family members in the management team, SEW can reveal its dark 
side if essential control mechanisms are absent. While recent works indicate that 
increased family involvement in ownership and management leads the family firm to 
increase its social performance (Marques et al., 2014; Dyer and Whetten, 2006), we find 
that family firms are only able to do so when a mix of outside directors and family 
members are present on the board. To be able to capitalize on the bright side of high 
family involvement in ownership and management while reducing its dark side, the 
presence of outside members on the board becomes essential. Outside board members 
can offer external and objective points of view and can link their personal connections 
and ties to the family business. In turn, impartial views can help mitigate intra-family 
conflict of interest and the additional ties brought into the business can counterweight the 
loss of social capital that results from the absence of non-family executives on the 
management team. In addition, outside directors can bring diversity into the board and 
can increase the family firm’s knowledge about opportunities for increasing its social 
engagement and social performance (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 2016). This finding is 
therefore congruent with the results of Bingham et al (2011), who found partial support 
for the thesis that increased family involvement in management is associated with better 
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environmental social performance. In fact, increased family involvement in management 
can lead to an increase in social performance depending on the presence of other relevant 
governance contingencies such as having outside directors on the board (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2016), and absolute family ownership (Marques et al., 2014).  
 
While these findings apply to both Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon countries, results 
also reveal three recipes that are specific to non-Anglo-Saxon countries. As previously 
argued, non-Anglo-Saxon countries have a general tendency to have a long-term 
stakeholder welfare orientation and to be less concerned about linking managerial 
compensation to firm profitability. Under these circumstances, when a management team 
dominated by family members is combined with the presence of a mix of outside and 
family directors on the board, the family business will be able to capitalize on the bright 
side of high family involvement in management. The close emotional and reputational 
association of family managers with the business and the ability of outside directors to 
mitigate intra-family conflict of interest and to provide additional advice on social issues, 
jointly lead to an increase in the family firm environmental social performance regardless 
of the level of family ownership of the business and the generation leading the family 
business.  
 
 Similarly, as shown in configuration #4 the family firm can increase its environmental 
social performance when the family shares business ownership with outsiders and when 
outside board members are present to mitigate the conflict of interest that may arise 
between family owners and outsiders. In non-Anglo-Saxon countries, a smaller 
percentage of companies have their total stock in free float. In these countries outside 
investors are more likely to be dedicated owners that care about the long-term welfare of 
the environment in which the company operates. Therefore, the presence of dedicated 
owners can bind the freedom that absolute family ownership grants to pursue solely 
family-centred goals and can increase the diversity of opinions in shareholder meetings. 
When this circumstance is combined with the presence of outside board members that 
mitigate any conflict of interest that may arise between dedicated outside investors and 
family owners, the family business can increase its environmental social performance 
regardless of the top management team composition and the generation leading the 
business. 
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Finally, the last configuration displayed very low coverage value (0.0266). This means 
that it represents a very small number of potential cases. This finding is intriguing as it 
indicates that in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, shared business ownership between family 
members and outsiders and a top management team dominated by first generation family 
members are sufficient conditions to increase the family firm’s environmental social 
performance regardless of the board composition. This might be explained by the 
willingness and ability of first generation managers to perform independent director roles. 
Due to their long-term association with the business, their seniority, and their power (both 
in the family and the business), first generation family members can mitigate intra-family 
conflicts that may arise in the management team, and may be able to capitalize on the 
diversity of shareholders to increase the opportunities and resources that the family 
business can use to invest in environmental friendly activities. However, due to the very 
low coverage found, future research must more deeply assess the plausibility of this 
finding.  
 
To sum up, among family firms, there is no “one size fit all” recipe to achieve increased 
levels of environmental social performance. Our results suggest several boundary 
conditions within which SEW reveals its bright side and increases the social performance 
of family firms. Given the importance of environmental social performance of family 
firms to address the social challenges that the world is facing (World Economic Forum, 
2016) and to increase overall family business performance (Neubaum et al., 2012), we 
outline below the important implications of our findings for SEW theory and for 
practitioners.  
 
3.7 Implications for SEW Theory 
This research empirically validates Kellermanns et al’s (2012) conceptual claim that SEW 
may sometimes, but not always, lead to proactive stakeholder engagement. While we only 
focused on proactive engagement towards the environment, this study reveals several 
boundary conditions within which SEW is able to reveal its bright side while reducing its 
dark side. Findings indicate that when the desire for family influence and control 
(reflected by 100% business ownership and a board dominated by family members) is 
tempered by a desire for professionalism (presence of non-family members in the 
management team), the family business is able to leverage the bright side of SEW. 
Similarly, the potential dark side of SEW that can manifest itself by an “us-against-them” 
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mentality and by increasing intra-family struggles for power (Gordon and Nicholson, 
2008) can be mitigated when outside directors are present on the board. The presence of 
outside directors, regardless of whether they are affiliates or independents, may contribute 
with external point of views regarding business and family issues and may enrich the 
social capital of the board while mitigating intra-family conflicts. Our findings also 
indicate that the consequences of the desire to preserve SEW might be context dependent. 
Specifically, in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, where there is a general tendency to have a 
strong stakeholder welfare orientation, the domination of family members in the 
management team and shared business ownership between the family and institutional 
owners might lead SEW to reveal its bright side, conditional on the presence of outside 
directors on the board. This suggests that future research using the SEW perspective must 
make careful consideration of contextual institutional factors when discussing its positive 
or negative valence (Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
   
3.8 Implications for Practice 
Our results suggest for family controlling owners and advisors that, when the family owns 
100% of the business and when family involvement in management is high, the presence 
of a mix of outside directors and family members on the board is essential to increase 
environmental social performance. However, when first generation family members are 
still involved in the business and when decision makers are not inclined to make family 
control a priority regardless of meritocratic considerations (i.e. in the presence of a 
professionalized management team), family members may be better suited to sit on the 
family business board to increase the family business social performance. Moreover, our 
results provide specific recommendations for family businesses embedded in non-Anglo-
Saxon countries. To be able to gain benefits from family employment, family firms that 
encourage family participation in the management team must appoint outside directors 
on the board to counterweight the loss of social capital that results from the absence of 
non-family executives and to mitigate the possibility of intra-family conflict of interest. 
Similarly, to be able to reap benefits out of shared business ownership between family 
members and outsiders, family controlling owners must encourage the appointment of 
outsiders on the board.  
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3.9 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
This exploratory study presents findings that provide several opportunities for future 
research to increase existing knowledge of the drivers of the environmental social 
performance of family firms. First, the study only focused on family involvement in 
ownership and management and on board composition as antecedents leading SEW to 
increase the environmental social performance of family firms. Although these 
governance contingencies are the most argued for and the most studied in the literature 
(e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Campopiano et al., 2014; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Sharma and 
Sharma, 2011; Cruz et al., 2014; Wiklund, 2006), it would be interesting to include other 
governance contingencies that may affect family business behavior. For example, implicit 
in our analysis is that high family involvement in management is associated with the 
presence of a family CEO. Unfortunately, the STEP data does not provide information 
about this variable.  Future research can explicitly include whether the family business 
CEO is a family member. In fact, the average tenure of family CEOs can be three to five 
times greater than that of non-family CEOs. This may lead family CEOs to have 
incentives to increase the social performance of the firm, as they will be able to gain long-
term reputational benefits out of environmental friendly activities (Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2006). Alternatively, the expectation of long tenures can make family CEOs 
entrenched in their positions displaying conservative behavior and discouraging the 
employment of new qualified non-family blood (Henderson et al., 2006).  
 
Moreover, it would be equally interesting to study how the presence of women in 
management would act in complementarity with other governance contingencies to affect 
the firm social strategies. While some literature emphasized the invisibility of women in 
family firms by having their opinions strongly influenced by family leaders (Martinez 
Jimenez, 2009); recent evidence suggests that the presence of women can positively 
influence the community satisfaction with socially responsible activities undertaken by 
the family firm (Peake et al., 2015; Del Mar Alonso-Almeida et al., 2017; Rodriguez-
Ariza et al., 2017).  
In addition, although our results indicate two general configurations for all family 
businesses and specific configurations for family businesses in Non-Anglo Saxon 
countries, the configurational approach could not identify specific configurations that 
apply to Anglo-Saxon countries. As a remedy, future research can replicate this study 
exclusively in Anglo-Saxon countries which will increase existing knowledge on other 
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combinations of governance contingencies that can affect the environmental social 
performance of family firms.  
 
Last, other family related variables can be used to explore drivers for increased family 
business environmental social performance. Family values, parenting, and the 
educational experiences of the family management team can be important variables that 
may affect the family firm social practices and are worth according systematic 
consideration in future scholarship (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 2016; Marques et al., 
2014; Sharma and Sharma, 2011).  
 
3.10 References 
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence 
in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 20c9-237. 
 
Aragón Amonarriz, C., & Iturrioz Landart, C. (2016). Responsible family ownership in 
small‐and medium‐sized family enterprises: an exploratory study. Business 
Ethics: A European Review, 25(1), 75-93. 
Bammens, Y., Voordeckers, W., & Van Gils, A. (2011). Boards of directors in family 
businesses: A literature review and research agenda. International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 13(2), 134-152. 
Becker, G. S. (1974). A theory of social interactions. Journal of political economy, 82(6), 
1063-1093. 
Bell, R. G., Filatotchev, I., & Aguilera, R. V. (2014). Corporate governance and investors' 
perceptions of foreign IPO value: An institutional perspective. Academy of 
Management Journal, 57(1), 301-320. 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010). 
Socioemotional wealth and corporate responses to institutional pressures: Do 
family-controlled firms pollute less?. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1), 
82-113. 
56 
 
   
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012). Socioemotional wealth in family 
firms: Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future 
research. Family Business Review, 25(3), 258-279. 
Bingham, J. B., Dyer Jr, W. G., Smith, I., & Adams, G. L. (2011). A stakeholder identity 
orientation approach to corporate social performance in family firms. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 99(4), 565-585. 
Bowen, H., 1953. Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. Harper & Row, New York. 
Campopiano, G., De Massis, A., & Chirico, F. (2014). Firm Philanthropy in Small-and 
Medium-Sized Family Firms: The Effects of Family Involvement in Ownership 
and Management. Family Business Review, 27(3), 244-258. 
Campopiano, G., & De Massis, A. (2015). Corporate social responsibility reporting: A 
content analysis in family and non-family firms. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 129(3), 511-534. 
Chen, C. J., & Jaggi, B. (2001). Association between independent non-executive 
directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 19(4), 285-310. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Pearson, A. W., & Barnett, T. (2012). Family Involvement, 
Family Influence, and Family-Centered non-economic Goals in Small Firms. 
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 36(2), 267-293 
Chrisman, J. J., Memili, E., & Misra, K. (2014). Nonfamily managers, family firms, and 
the winner's curse: The influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38(5), 1103-1127. 
Cennamo, C., Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez‐Mejia, L. R. (2012). Socioemotional 
Wealth and Proactive Stakeholder Engagement: Why Family‐Controlled Firms 
Care More About Their Stakeholders. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
36(6), 1153-1173. 
57 
 
Chirico, F., & Bau, M. (2014). Is the family an “Asset” or “Liability” for firm 
performance? The moderating role of environmental dynamism. Journal of Small 
Business Management, 52(2), 210-225. 
Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Certo, S. T., & Hitt, M. A. (2010). Marching to the beat of 
different drummers: The influence of institutional owners on competitive actions. 
Academy of Management Journal, 53(4), 723-742. 
Craig, J., & Dibrell, C. (2006). The natural environment, innovation, and firm 
performance: A comparative study. Family Business Review, 19(4), 275-288. 
Cruz, C., Larraza‐Kintana, M., Garcés‐Galdeano, L., & Berrone, P. (2014). Are family 
firms really more socially responsible? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
38(6), 1295-1316. 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & García-Sánchez, I. M. (2015). The role 
of independent directors at family firms in relation to corporate social 
responsibility disclosures. International Business Review, 24(5), 890-901. 
Del Mar Alonso-Almeida, M., Perramon, J. and Bagur-Femenias, L. (2017).  Leadership 
styles and corporate social responsibility management. Analysis from a gender 
perspective.  Business Ethics: A European Review, 26 (2), 147-161. 
De Massis, A., Kotlar, J., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. (2014). Ability and Willingness 
as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: 
Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 52(2), 344-364. 
Déniz, M. D. L. C. D., & Suárez, M. K. C. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and 
family business in Spain. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(1), 27-41. 
Dyer, W. G., & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility: 
Preliminary evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
30(6), 785-802. 
Feliu, N., & Botero, I. C. (2016). Philanthropy in Family Enterprises: A Review of 
Literature. Family Business Review, 29(1), 121-141. 
58 
 
   
Fiss, P. C. (2007). A set-theoretic approach to organizational configurations. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(4), 1180-1198. 
Fiss, P. C. (2011). Building better causal theories: A fuzzy set approach to typologies in 
organization research. Academy of Management Journal, 54(2), 393-420. 
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder perspective. Boston: 
Pitman. 
Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2005). Outside directors in SME boards: A call for 
theoretical reflections. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, 1(1), 28-
37. 
Garcia-Castro, R., & Casasola, M. J. (2011). A set-theoretic analysis of the components 
of family involvement in publicly listed and major unlisted firms. Journal of 
Family Business Strategy, 2(1), 15-25. 
García‐Castro, R., Aguilera, R. V., & Ariño, M. A. (2013). Bundles of firm corporate 
governance practices: A fuzzy set analysis. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 21(4), 390-407. 
Garcia-Castro, R., & Aguilera, R. V. (2014). Family involvement in business and 
financial performance: A set-theoretic cross-national inquiry. Journal of Family 
Business Strategy, 5(1), 85-96. 
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J., & Moyano-
Fuentes, J. (2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled 
firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative science quarterly, 
52(1), 106-137. 
Henderson, A. D., Miller, D., & Hambrick, D. C. (2006). How quickly do CEOs become 
obsolete? Industry dynamism, CEO tenure, and company performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27(5), 447-460. 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: 
Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of 
Management review, 28(3), 383-396. 
59 
 
James, H. S. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. 
International journal of the economics of business, 6(1), 41-55. 
Judge, W. Q., & Douglas, T. J. (1998). Performance implications of incorporating natural 
environmental issues into the strategic planning process: An empirical 
assessment. Journal of Management Studies, 35(2), 241-262. 
Kellermanns, F. W., Eddleston, K. A., & Zellweger, T. M. (2012). Extending the 
socioemotional wealth perspective: A look at the dark side. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 36(6), 1175-1182. 
Kidwell, R. E., Kellermanns, F. W., & Eddleston, K. A. (2012). Harmony, justice, 
confusion, and conflict in family firms: Implications for ethical climate and the 
“fredo effect”. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(4), 503-517. 
Kim, J., Fairclough, S., & Dibrell, C. (2016). Attention, Action, and Greenwash in 
Family-Influenced Firms? Evidence From Polluting Industries. Organization & 
Environment. DOI: 10.1177/1086026616673410, 1-20 
Kraus, S., Mensching, H., Calabrò, A., Cheng, C. F., & Filser, M. (2016). Family firm 
internationalization: A configurational approach. Journal of Business Research. 
Lähdesmäki, M. (2012). Construction of owner–manager identity in corporate social 
responsibility discourse. Business ethics: a European review, 21(2), 168-182. 
Lane, S., Astrachan, J., Keyt, A., & McMillan, K. (2006). Guidelines for family business 
boards of directors. Family Business Review, 19(2), 147-167. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2016). Family firms and practices of sustainability: A 
contingency view. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 7(1), 26-33. 
Longest, K. C., & Vaisey, S. (2008). fuzzy: A program for performing qualitative 
comparative analyses (QCA) in Stata. Stata Journal, 8(1), 79. 
Mackey, A., Mackey, T. B., & Barney, J. B. (2007). Corporate social responsibility and 
firm performance: Investor preferences and corporate strategies. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(3), 817-835. 
60 
 
   
Marques, P., Presas, P., & Simon, A. (2014). The heterogeneity of family firms in CSR 
engagement: The role of values. Family Business Review, 27, 206-227. 
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the 
firm perspective. Academy of management review, 26(1), 117-127. 
Meyer, A. D., Tsui, A. S., & Hinings, C. R. (1993). Configurational approaches to 
organizational analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 36(6), 1175-1195. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 367-382. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2004). Family control and the rent‐seeking society. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28(4), 391-409. 
Niehm, L. S., Swinney, J., & Miller, N. J. (2008). Community social responsibility and 
its consequences for family business performance. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 46(3), 331-350. 
Nordqvist, M., Sharma, P., & Chirico, F. (2014). Family firm heterogeneity and 
governance: A configuration approach. Journal of Small Business Management, 
52(2), 192-209. 
Neubaum, D.O., Dibrell, C., & Craig, J. B. 2012. Balancing natural environmental 
concerns of internal and external stakeholders in family and non-family 
businesses, Journal of Family Business Strategy, 3(1): 28-37. 
Pappas, I. O., Giannakos, M. N., & Sampson, D. (2016). Making Sense of Learning 
Analytics with a Configurational Approach. In Proceedings of the workshop on 
Smart Environments and Analytics in Video-Based Learning (SE@ VBL), 
LAK2016. 
Peake, W. O., Cooper, D., Fitzgerald, M. A., & Muske, G. (2014). Family Business 
Participation in Community Social Responsibility: The Moderating Effect of 
Gender. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-19. 
61 
 
Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the 
world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517. 
Porter, M. E. (1992). Capital choices: Changing the way America invests in industry. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(2), 4-16. 
Ragin, C. C. (2008). User’s guide to fuzzy-set/qualitative comparative 
analysis. www.fsqca.com. From www.fsqca.com.  
Ragin, C. C., & Fiss, P. C. (2008). Net effects analysis versus configurational analysis: 
An empirical demonstration. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond, 
190-212. 
Ragin, C.C. (2009). Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets. In B. Rihoux,, & 
C.C. Ragin, (EDS). Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques (applied social research 
methods) (pp.87-121). Thousand oaks and London: Sage. 
Rodriguez-Ariza, L., Cuadrado-Bassesteros, B. and Martinez-Ferrero, J. The role of 
female directors in promoting CSR practices: An international comparison 
between family and non-family businesses.  Business Ethics: A European Review, 
26(2), 162-174. 
Roig-Tierno, N., Huarng, K. H., & Ribeiro-Soriano, D. (2016). Qualitative comparative 
analysis: Crisp and fuzzy sets in business and management. Journal of Business 
Research, 69(4), 1261-1264. 
Samara, G., & Arenas, D. (2017). Practicing fairness in the family business workplace. 
Business Horizons. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2017.05.008. 
Samara, G., & Berbegal-Mirabent, J. (2017). Independent directors and family firm 
performance: does one size fit all?. International Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal. DOI: 10.1007/s11365-017-0455-6. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency 
relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization science, 12(2), 
99-116. 
62 
 
   
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003). Toward a theory of agency and 
altruism in family firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4), 473-490. 
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2010). Standards of good practice in qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. Comparative Sociology, 9(3), 397-
418. 
Sharma, P., & Sharma, S. (2011). Drivers of proactive environmental strategy in family 
firms. Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(02), 309-334. 
Uhlaner, L. M., van Goor-Balk, H. J. M., & Masurel, E. (2004). Family business and 
corporate social responsibility in a sample of Dutch firms. Journal of Small 
Business and Enterprise Development, 11(2), 186-194. 
Van Gils, A., Dibrell, C., Neubaum, D. O., & Craig, J. B. (2014). Social issues in the 
family enterprise. Family Business Review, 27(3), 193-205. 
Vazquez, P. (2016). Family Business Ethics: At the Crossroads of Business Ethics and 
Family Business. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-19. 
Wiklund, J. (2006). Commentary: “Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary 
Evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 30, 803–808.  
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A behavioral agency model of 
managerial risk taking. Academy of management Review, 23(1), 133-153. 
Wood, D. J. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management 
Review, 16(4), 691-718. 
Wood, D. J. (2010). Measuring corporate social performance: A review. International 
Journal of Management Reviews, 12(1), 50-84. 
Woodside, A. G., & Zhang, M. (2012). Identifying x-consumers using causal 
recipes:“Whales” and “jumbo shrimps” casino gamblers. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 28(1), 13-26. 
63 
 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (2016), Mastering the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution, Switzerland, Author: Rosamond Hutt. 
Zellweger, T. M., & Nason, R. S. (2008). A stakeholder perspective on family firm 
performance. Family Business Review, 21(3), 203-216. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
   
4 
 
 Independent directors and family business 
performance: Does one size fit all? 
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How will the presence of independent directors affect family business performance? This 
question is still theoretically debated and empirically inconclusive. Because family 
businesses are a group of heterogeneous companies with different levels of family 
involvement in the business, the purpose of this paper is to empirically explore how the 
combination of different family business governance structures jointly shape the effect of 
independent directors on family business performance in an understudied Collectivist 
cultural setting. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on a sample of 74 
Lebanese family firms this study finds that, depending on the family firm governance 
structure, the presence of independent directors on the board can lead to either positive 
or negative firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Holdal Group, a Lebanese 100% family owned firm, has been featured in 2014 for the 
second consecutive year as one of the top 100 companies in the Arab world (Forbes 
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Middle East 2014). One of the distinctive features of this company is that the chairs of its 
board of directors are exclusively held by family members. This contradicts the common 
prescription in corporate governance codes around the world that suggests that the 
presence of independent directors on the board is necessary to achieve firm survivability 
and success. In fact, in the distinctive context of family businesses, the relationship 
between the presence of independent directors on the board and firm performance is 
theoretically debated and empirically inconclusive. Theoretically, research adopts agency 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) and stewardship theories (Davis et al. 1997) as separate lens 
to determine the effect of independent directors on firm performance (Madison et al. 
2016). Empirically, positive (e.g. Anderson and Reeb 2004; Arosa et al. 2010; Kuo and 
Hung 2012), negative (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; García-Ramos and García-Olalla 
2011), and no effect (e.g. Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. 2015; Dalton et al. 1998; Gnan et 
al. 2015) of independent directors presence is associated to family business performance. 
 
The existence of competing arguments and inconclusive findings indicates that the 
presence of independent directors on the family business board may sometimes, but not 
always, contribute to family business performance. Despite recent evidence which shows 
that family businesses are a group of heterogeneous companies with different levels of 
family involvement in the business (Chrisman and Patel 2012; Garcia-Castro and 
Aguilera 2014) and that the Collectivist culture is an important institutional setting that 
affects the success or failure of governance mechanisms in family firms (Pagliarussi and 
Rapozo 2011; Sharma and Manikutty 2005), little attention has been devoted to these 
important contingencies when discussing the effect of independent directors on family 
business performance. To address these gaps, the aim of this paper is to explore the 
following question: in a Collectivist culture, how do different family business governance 
contingencies shape the effect of independent directors on family business performance? 
 
Using QCA, this paper explores different governance contingencies that shape the effect 
of independent directors on the performance of 74 Lebanese companies. QCA is an 
increasingly popular method in management (Huarng 2015) and in family business 
research (e.g. Garcia-Castro and Aguilera 2014; Kraus et al. 2016) that allows to 
investigate heterogeneous combinations of causal conditions that lead to a certain 
outcome (Ragin 2010). 
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Through the recognition of complexity theory, this study offers several theoretical and 
practical contributions. This study offers an interesting case for the comparison of 
previous research employing the simplistic narrative of linear relations among variables 
against results employing a more nuanced analytical technique that allows for the 
identification of counter-intuitive and multi-dimensional causal recipes. By doing so, this 
study is able to empirically validate the mutual ability of agency and stewardship theories 
to explain family business performance (Madison et al. 2016), thereby reconciling 
previous competing arguments and conflicting results found in the literature. Moreover, 
by exploring Lebanese family businesses, this paper heeds calls from Anderson and Reeb 
(2004), Evert et al. (2016), and Villalonga and Amit (2006) to explore new geographical 
cultural settings to truly understand strategic decision making in family firms. The study 
also responds to calls from Chrisman et al. (2013) and Nordqvist et al. (2014) to start 
using a configuration approach to unfold the complex systems of interdependencies that 
allows for a better explanation of family business performance outcomes. Particularly we 
find that, depending on the combination of several governance contingencies, the 
presence of independent directors on the family firm board can either be an asset or a 
liability. For practitioners, this paper offers several governance recipes that can assist 
Collectivist family business owners and advisors to decide when the appointment of 
independent directors should be encouraged or discouraged to achieve better firm 
performance. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we clearly 
differentiate independent directors from other board members. Next, we review relevant 
research in agency and stewardship theories to provide an explanation of the different 
theorized roles of independent directors on the family business board. Moving forward, 
we argue how the Collectivist cultural setting shapes the attitudes of family members 
inside the firm. Then, we discuss how different governance contingencies influence the 
effect of independent directors on family business performance. The subsequent sections 
present and explain our data and results. Lastly, we elaborate on the theoretical 
contributions and conclude with the practical implications. 
 
4.2 Board of directors: Insiders, affiliates, and independents 
The members of the board of directors are classified as insiders or outsiders. Insiders 
include firm employees, retired employees and/or family members. Outside directors 
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respond to either affiliates or independent directors (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Voordeckers et al. 2007; Zahra and Pearce 1989). Affiliates are directors that have 
potential or existing personal relationships with the family and/or the firm (e.g. Anderson 
and Reeb 2004; Jones et al. 2008). Examples of affiliates include lawyers, investment 
bankers, financiers, and consultants (e.g. Anderson and Reeb 2004; Arosa et al. 2010). 
Independent directors are outsiders that have no social ties neither with the company nor 
with the family. Instead, their sole relationship with the business begins with their 
directorship. The main difference between affiliates and independent directors is that 
affiliates, due to their long term business relationship, are able to forge strong social ties 
with the top management team. However, independent directors usually serve for a 
shorter period of time and have less opportunity to forge social ties with the management 
team or the family. While affiliates can play an advisory role without affecting the 
perceived control of the family over the business, independent directors can be perceived 
as a threat to the family’s control and decision making ability (Anderson and Reeb 2004; 
Jones et al. 2008; Westphal 1999). The following section presents agency and 
stewardship theories to discuss the effect of the presence of independent directors on 
family business performance. 
 
4.3 Theoretical framework: Agency and stewardship theories 
4.3.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory suggests that principals (i.e. owners) delegate some agents (i.e. managers) 
to run the company on their behalf. Agency theory predicts that a conflict of interest arises 
when opportunistic managers seek to achieve their own self-interest on the detriment of 
the interests of less informed shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). As a remedy for 
this conflict of interest, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that monitoring by independent 
directors can be one of the effective measures to control opportunistic behavior of agents 
and to re-align interests of owners and managers. 
When considering whether family firms need independent directors to monitor the 
management team research offers two competing stances. The first stance suggests that 
family involvement in ownership and management creates an automatic alignment of 
interest between shareholders and family managers; which mitigates information 
asymmetries and reduces agency costs (Chrisman et al. 2004; Herrero 2011; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Zahra and Stanton 1988). In addition, motivated by the protection of the 
family’s financial wealth, family managers are in a good position and have strong 
68 
 
   
incentives to monitor other non-family employees (Anderson et al. 2009). Given the 
aforementioned considerations, the presence of independent directors has been 
considered as an additional unnecessary cost when the business is family owned (Fama 
and Jensen 1983). 
 
The second stance stretches the theoretical boundaries of agency theory; suggesting that 
non-traditional agency problems such as asymmetric altruism (Chua et al. 2009; Schulze 
et al. 2001) and family entrenchment (e.g. Villalonga and Amit 2006) result from 
opportunistic attitudes of family managers. Asymmetric altruism creates a moral hazard 
agency problem where family controlling owners are excessively generous towards their 
kin and hold back from monitoring unqualified opportunistic family members (Chua et 
al. 2009; Schulze et al. 2001). Also, entrenchment creates an adverse selection problem 
where family controlling owners employ family members regardless of their 
qualifications; resulting in the presence of an unqualified management team and in the 
loss of managerial talent (e.g. Chrisman et al. 2014; Schulze et al. 2001). These problems 
are identified as a type one agency problem. 
 
A principal-principal conflict of interest is also identified as a type two agency problem. 
Due to the dominant family shareholders desire for income and wealth preservation 
within the family, family shareholders become more risk averse and have incentives to 
engage in non-profit maximizing objectives that only serve family interests (Anderson 
and Reeb 2004; Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2009; Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011). This 
conflict of interest also occurs in the presence of a multi-family firm where different 
extended family groups own the business (Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011). For example, 
family shareholders are prone to extract private rents through special dividends, excessive 
compensation schemes, and through diverting company assets for private use (Anderson 
and Reeb 2004). Recent evidence suggests that this principal-principal conflict of interest 
is especially likely when firm performance deteriorates, when the CEO is a family 
member, and when the founder is no longer involved in the business (Martin et al. 2016). 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, the presence of independent directors on the 
family firm board becomes an essential control mechanism that contributes to reducing 
agency costs and to achieving better firm performance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb 2004; 
Bammens et al. 2011). 
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4.3.2 Stewardship theory 
Alternatively, stewardship theory holds different assumptions on the behaviors of family 
business employees and on the role of independent directors inside the firm. Stewardship 
theory is anchored in a humanistic model where people are motivated by serving others. 
The organization is seen as an involvement oriented and empowering structure where 
mutual trust-based relationships develop. Organizational members work as a collective, 
are trustworthy, and display pro-organizational conduct (Davis et al. 1997). 
 
When applied to family firms, stewardship theory suggests that relationships inside the 
family business will be dominated by reciprocal altruism and a participative strategy 
(Corbetta and Salvato 2004b). Because of their emotional and social attachment to the 
business, family members practice self-restraint and carefully consider the consequences 
of their actions on the firm (Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007). The use of a participative 
strategy that empowers employees leads them to be more engaged in the long-term 
business strategy and to have greater commitment and motivation to work in the business 
(Davis et al. 1997; Zahra 2003). For instance, research shows that identification with the 
family firm and commitment to family business prosperity and success are common traits 
of family business managers (Davis et al. 2010). This leads family employees to place 
the business objectives ahead of their own (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005; Salloum 
et al. 2013b). Stewardship behavior reduces relationship conflict inside the business and 
increases the level of collaboration, harmony, and knowledge sharing between employees 
(Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007). Practices such as the ones described above enable 
family businesses to develop an important source of competitive advantage over their 
non-family counterparts (Corbetta and Salvato 2004b). 
 
Through stewardship theory lenses, the essential role of independent directors is not to 
provide contractual controlled monitoring. Instead, controlling owners mostly rely on 
trust-based monitoring. Independent directors are appointed on the board for their ability 
to provide service and advice to shareholders. Therefore, the presence of independent 
directors is considered as an added value for the company because they are able to bring 
industry-specific expertise that cannot be obtained by the virtue of insiders or affiliates 
appointment (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Corbetta and Salvato 2004b; García-Ramos and 
García-Olalla 2011). 
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4.3.3 Complementarity of agency and stewardship theories predictions 
When compared, agency and stewardship theories differ in their consideration of two 
elements: the attitudes of family business employees inside the business (i.e. 
opportunistic agents/good stewards) and the role of independent directors (i.e. controlled 
monitoring/service and advice) on the board. Table 1 summarizes the main behavioral 
assumptions of agency and stewardship theories. 
 
Table 1. Agency and Stewardship theories main behavioral assumptions and 
arguments 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Main 
behavioral 
assumption 
People are self-interested and opportunistic by 
nature 
People are stewards by nature 
and are motivated by serving 
others 
Effect of 
family 
employment  
inside the 
business 
Automatic alignment 
of interest between 
shareholders and 
management. 
 
Family managers are 
able to monitor other 
non-family 
employees. 
 
Type one agency 
problem: entrenchment 
and asymmetric altruism.  
 
Type two agency 
problem: a principal-
principal conflict of 
interest between family 
shareholders and 
minority 
shareholders/between 
different family groups 
owning the business. 
Reciprocal altruism and a 
participative strategy will 
dominate business 
relationships. 
 
Emotional and social 
attachment of family members 
to the business. 
 
Family members have more 
commitment and motivation to 
work in the business.  
The role of 
independent 
directors 
Controlled monitoring for the firm management 
team and/or mitigate the principle-principle 
conflict of interest.  
 
To provide service, advice, and 
industry-specific expertise. 
The effect of 
independent 
directors 
An additional 
unnecessary cost. 
Improves firm 
performance by reducing 
type one and type two 
agency costs. 
Improves firm performance by 
providing service and advice to 
the firm. 
 
 
As previously argued and as shown in Table 1, competing arguments and conflicting 
results surround the relationship between the presence of independent directors on the 
board and family business performance. Plausibly, the main reason for these competing 
views is that research has so far considered family businesses as a homogenous group 
(Chrisman et al. 2013; Nordqvist et al. 2014). However, recent works indicate that family 
businesses are a group of heterogeneous companies (Chrisman and Patel 2012; Garcia-
Castro and Aguilera 2014) with different governance structures and needs (Corbetta and 
Salvato 2004a). In other words, the recommendation of having independent directors on 
the board does not fit all family businesses. Theoretically, a starting point to account for 
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family business heterogeneity is not to consider family business protagonists exclusively 
as agents or stewards. Particularly, different cultural and governance contingencies can 
shape the attitude of family members inside the business (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Chen 
et al. 2002; Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011); which, in turn, can determine whether the 
presence of independent directors can be considered as an asset or a liability for the family 
firm. In the next sections, we theoretically discuss and empirically explore how different 
governance contingencies jointly shape the effect of independent directors on family 
business performance in an understudied Collectivist culture. 
 
4.4 Agency and stewardship in collectivist family businesses 
Three reasons motivate the exploration of the Collectivist national cultural setting. First, 
the domination of family businesses as an organizational form is greater in Collectivist 
cultures than in Individualist cultures (Chakrabarty 2009); yet, few studies built theory 
considering this distinct cultural setting (Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011; Sharma and 
Manikutty 2005). Second, the Collectivist cultural setting is more predictive than other 
cultural dimensions in managerial decision making (Crossland and Hambrick 2011), 
being considered as a core dimension for distinguishing cultures (e.g. Cannon et al. 2010), 
and appearing in several recognized frameworks in the literature as a predictor of 
behaviors of family employees (e.g. Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011; Sharma and Manikutty 
2005). Third, Collectivism hints at the prevalence of an extended family structure where 
values of reciprocal altruism are dominant between members of the in-group (Hofstede 
1984; Sharma and Manikutty 2005). 
 
An important implication of family business embeddedness in a Collectivist culture is 
that family members will prioritize the in-group interest over their own (Husted and Allen 
2008; Triandis 1995). At the same time, family members will regard people that have no 
prior relationship with them as part of the out-group. In-groups will form higher prejudice 
and formalization when dealing with people from the out-group (Chen et al. 2002; 
Hofstede 1984). As a result, in-group/out-group perceptions create a mixed 
organizational culture inside the family firm. A clan and adhocracy based organizational 
culture will be dominant when interactions occur between members of the in-group and 
a market and hierarchical culture will be dominant when interactions occur between 
members of the out-group (Corbetta and Salvato 2004b; Hofstede 1984; Cameron and 
Quinn 2005). The former configuration is characterized by a friendly work environment 
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that is found to facilitate relationship exchange and tacit firm knowledge sharing. Hence, 
stewardship behaviors are more likely to be dominant when interactions occur between 
members of the in-group. However, the latter (a market and hierarchy culture) has been 
characterized by a transactional hierarchical structure which is found to negatively impact 
tacit knowledge sharing among individuals (Suppiah and Singh Sandhu 2011). Therefore, 
an agency environment is likely to occur when interactions occur between members of 
the out-group (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Chen et al. 2002). Hence, because family 
business employees and affiliates have already forged social ties with the family, they are 
likely to be considered as members of the in-group. Independent directors, however, 
usually serve for a shorter period of time and do not have the opportunity to forge a social 
relationship with family members involved in the business. Consequently, they are more 
likely be considered as members of the out-group. 
 
4.5 Governance contingencies 
This section builds on the previously contextualized agency and stewardship theoretical 
frameworks to discuss several governance contingencies that shape the effect of 
independent directors on family firm performance. 
 
4.5.1 Family ownership 
When the extended family owns 100% of the business equity, family employees will more 
likely regard the company as an economic wealth generating institution for all family 
members (Herrero 2011; Miller et al. 2013). Absolute family ownership of the business 
implies that gains and losses coming from the business revenues will be directly endured 
by the family, giving family employees strong incentives to reciprocate altruism when 
shown to them (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007). In addition, 
the principal-principal conflict of interest that results from the presence of minority 
shareholders and/or different extended family groups owning the business is 
automatically nullified. For example, there is no need for the family to try to extract 
private rents through special dividends as the family will directly benefit from the 
reinvestment of profits in the business. 
 
Conversely, when the business is less than 100% family owned, Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) suggest a risk of a principal-principal conflict of interest between minority 
shareholders’ against and the majority controlling owners. Specifically, when businesses 
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are privately held, a conflict of interest is likely to occur when different extended families 
share business ownership (Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011). In addition, managers and 
directors coming from different extended families will find it difficult to monitor other 
family members working in the organization. The latter statement is exemplified by the 
words of a family manager in Brazil discussing his incapacity to monitor the work 
behavior of the son of his business partner: “How am I going to tell the son of my 
partner—someone I love, that I treat like a brother—that he can’t act a certain way? How 
am I going to tell him he’s wrong if he thinks he can manage a company while only 
arriving at 10 in the morning? If I said anything it would hurt his father, see?” (Pagliarussi 
and Rapozo 2011, p.178). 
 
The previous argumentation suggests that independent directors are not needed when the 
family owns 100% of the business. Under this circumstance, family members involved 
in the business have less incentives to show opportunistic behavior and more incentives 
to show stewardship behaviors (Herrero 2011). This makes the presence of independent 
directors an additional unnecessary cost for the family firm; which can consequently 
constrain firm performance. 
 
However, when the family owns less than 100% of the business, the presence of 
independent directors becomes essential to mitigate the possible principle-principle 
conflict of interest that initiates between different family groups owning the business 
(Villalonga and Amit 2006) and to effectively monitor the family business management 
team (Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011). All these elements increase the family business need 
for controlled monitoring by independent directors to improve firm performance. 
 
 
4.5.2 Family management 
When the business is 100% family owned and there is a high family involvement in 
management, family members have incentives to perform the role of independent 
directors. Driven by their perception of the business as a wealth generating institution, 
family employees have incentives to monitor other non-family employees (Anderson et 
al. 2009) and to draw on their privileged access to exclusive networks, personal 
relationships (Zahra 2010), and family derived social capital (Arregle et al. 2007) to 
provide service and advice to the firm. In this context, the risk of family employees 
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perceiving independent directors as out-group members who interfere in their family 
affairs increases (Westphal 1999); which can create conflict in the family business. For 
example the founder of Otsuka Kagu, a Japanese furniture producer, fired his daughter 
from her managerial position for bringing an outside director to sit alongside family 
members on the firm’s board (Economist 2015, p.52). 
 
However, low family involvement in management creates the risk of having unmonitored 
non-family agents on the management team. As family involvement in management 
decreases, the ability of obtaining benefits from the family derived social capital 
decreases and the need for monitoring, service and advice by independent directors 
increases (Anderson and Reeb 2004). Tensions that may arise between family members 
and independent directors are also automatically reduced. 
 
From these arguments, it can be inferred that high family involvement in management 
makes the presence of independent directors an additional unnecessary cost. In addition, 
the presence of independent outsiders (e.g. out-group members) can create conflict inside 
the business; which can consequently lead to a decrease in firm performance (Jaskiewicz 
and Klein 2007; Corbetta and Salvato 2004a). 
 
However, when family involvement in management is low, the threat of conflict of 
interest between ownership (by the family) and management (by non-family members) is 
reestablished. Accordingly, the presence of independent directors becomes essential to 
monitor any conflict of interest between ownership and management and to obtain 
benefits from the external social capital that independent directors bring (Anderson and 
Reeb 2004). All these elements suggest that, when family involvement in management is 
low, independent directors can catalyze firm performance. 
 
4.5.3 Founder CEO  
Founder led family businesses are able to capitalize on the positive side of parental 
altruism which facilitates trust, knowledge sharing, and reciprocity among family 
members (García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011). Because of their superior emotional 
attachment and their identification with the firm, founders can monitor firm employees 
and can use their social capital to direct the business towards achieving optimal 
performance (e.g. Dyer 1988; Miller et al. 2013). 
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 When founders are no longer present in the firm, parental altruism can reveal its dark side 
(Lubatkin et al. 2005; Bammens et al. 2008). Shared business ownership between 
different extended family groups creates a risk of a principal-principal conflict of interest 
between different extended family group members involved in the business. In fact, there 
is a risk that future generations pursue their own family interests on the detriment of other 
family shareholders involved in the business and, eventually, on the detriment of the firm 
(Basco and Voordeckers 2015). 
 
Given the aforementioned observations it can be inferred that when founders are still 
involved as CEOs of the family business they have both the incentive and the power to 
perform the role of independent directors (Miller et al. 2013), making therefore, the 
presence of independent directors an additional unnecessary cost. 
 
However, future generations CEOs have less incentives to perform independent directors 
role. Furthermore, the struggle for power over the CEO position increases the need for 
outside impartial views to mitigate any potential conflict between different nuclear family 
groups involved in the business. Consequently, this increases the need for the services of 
independent directors to mitigate all these conflict of interests and to achieve better 
performance (Basco and Voordeckers 2015; Lubatkin et al. 2005). 
 
4.5.4 Board size 
When the board is small, research shows that there will be a higher alignment of interest 
between principals and agents; which eliminates the need for formal monitoring by 
independent directors (Jaskiewicz and Klein 2007). Conversely, empirical research shows 
that larger boards are associated with less alignment of interest between ownership and 
management (Jaskiewicz and Klein 2007). Specifically, larger boards inhibit individual 
responsibility as it becomes more difficult to hold directors responsible for family 
business performance outcomes. 
 
Consequently, we argue that if small boards are dominated by family directors that are 
monitoring the management team and that are using their family derived social capital to 
provide service and advice for the firm, the presence of independent directors can become 
an additional unnecessary cost that can constrain firm performance. 
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However, in large boards where individual responsibility is inhibited, the risk of 
opportunistic behavior and/or neglect of duties (Lane et al. 2006) increases. Under these 
circumstances, having diversity on the board (i.e. family members, affiliates, and 
independent directors) by appointing independent directors becomes more important to 
achieve better firm performance. 
 
4.6 Data and method 
4.6.1 Data 
The Middle East provides an understudied geographical context where family businesses 
are rooted historically and economically (Welsh and Raven 2006). Specifically, this paper 
focuses on Lebanon, a Collectivist culture where families dominate political rule and 
business ownership (Welsh and Raven 2006). Although an interesting and special 
environment where several new insights can be gained (Zahra 2011), the Middle East is 
an extremely challenging empirical setting since response rate to mail surveys is low and 
archival data is rare and questionable in quality (Welsh and Raven 2006; Zahra 2011). 
 
We initiated the data collection procedure by purchasing a database from 
www.reachgulfbusiness.com. This website offers personal contact names, phone 
numbers, and emails of owners and managers of Lebanese companies. The database 
included 3951 Lebanese companies. Given the challenging nature of data collection 
through mail surveys in the Middle East (Zahra 2011), this paper follows Arosa et al. 
(2010) by collecting survey data through telephone interviews. All interviews were done 
in English language. There was no language barrier in the interviews as the majority of 
Lebanese business owners, managers, and employees speak and understand English 
language. Considering cost efficiencies, 100 companies that have the legal form of 
“Lebanese Joint Stock Company” were selected and contacted. We chose this specific 
legal form of companies as they are forced by law to have a board of directors. 77 
companies agreed to participate in the survey. Data was collected during the months of 
May and June, 2016. To limit the threat of social desirability, we guaranteed respondent 
anonymity to all the interviewees before starting data collection. Guarantying anonymity 
has been argued to reduce the threat of common method bias (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; 
Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
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The dataset included privately held family businesses which are an understudied 
population (Carney et al. 2015) that largely dominate the Lebanese economy. The 
analysis was also limited to companies that have at least 25% family ownership and at 
least one family member in the management team of the business. These are the two 
criteria that are most adopted in the literature to identify family firms (De Massis et al. 
2012). Three companies were eliminated because they had less than one family member 
in the management team or because the family owned less than 25% of the business. The 
final sample included 74 Lebanese private Joint Stock Companies. More than 75% of the 
respondents were either shareholders, and/or members of the management teams, and/or 
members of the board of directors. The remaining respondents were firm employees with 
at least two years of experience. Respondents were thus well informed about the company 
characteristics. In terms of company age, the sample covered a wide range of companies. 
The oldest company was founded in 1857 and the youngest company was founded in 
2014. Table 2 and Table 3 show the distribution of companies in terms of the sector of 
activity and the education level of the respondents, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of companies according to sector 
Sector Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Food and Beverages 20.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 
Banking. Finance and 
Insurance 2.0 2.7 2.7 29.7 
Manufacturing 9.0 12.2 12.2 41.9 
Tourism 11.0 14.9 14.9 56.8 
Telecommunications 6.0 8.1 8.1 64.9 
Other 3.0 4.1 4.1 68.9 
Real Estate 6.0 8.1 8.1 77.0 
Media 3.0 4.1 4.1 81.1 
Retail 14.0 18.9 18.9 100.0 
Total 74.0 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3. Distribution of respondents according to educational level. 
Highest level of education Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
High School 4.0 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Bachelor’s Degree 46.0 62.2 62.2 67.6 
Master’s Degree 24.0 32.4 32.4 100.0 
Total 74.0 100.0 100.0  
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As shown in Table 2, companies surveyed are highly diversified in terms of sector and 
show an accurate representation of sectors commonly found in the Lebanese economy 
(Salloum et al. 2013a) increasing the external validity of the study. Table 2 also reveals 
that all respondents had a good educational level, corroborating that respondents were 
qualified to understand and answer questions related to business governance and 
performance. 
 
4.6.2 Philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of social reality 
This paper adopts a positivist philosophical approach to fill a void in existing knowledge. 
The phenomenon is examined in its naturalistic context with the purpose of confronting 
theory with the empirical reality (Piekkari et al. 2009). Reality is considered as objective 
and the research purpose is to generate knowledge “in the form of measurable regularities, 
laws and patterns” (Leppäaho et al. 2016, p.2) that allows for a replication logic and for 
the search for general patterns (Langley and Abdallah 2011). 
 
4.6.3 Method 
Based on the positivist philosophical orientation and consistent with the aim to explore 
how the combination of different governance contingencies shapes the effect of 
independent directors on family business performance in a Collectivist culture, this paper 
uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Because the management field is causally 
complex (Kostova and Zaheer 1999), it requires alternative analytical methods. QCA fills 
this gap by offering a series of advantages over traditional multiple regression analysis 
(Woodside 2013). First, comparative research methods such as QCA are particularly 
suitable for multilevel explanations and influences. QCA overcomes the limitations 
coming from linearity and complementary associations between variables by assuming 
asymmetrical relationships (Fiss 2011). That is, QCA does not require researchers to 
assume that the antecedent conditions (the independent variables) are only linear-
additive, but rather necessitates the analysis of net effects (Mills et al. 2006). Second, 
while in regression analysis the main goal is to discover the effect of a variable on a 
particular outcome, in QCA the focus is on what combination of antecedent conditions 
lead to a given outcome (Longest and Vaisey 2008). Third, QCA entails equifinality, 
meaning that there are multiple paths (configurations or causal recipes in QCA 
terminology) that can conduce to the same outcome. Feasible recipes are not just 
combinations of antecedent conditions (either positive or negative) but also of their 
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absence (Wu et al. 2014). Lastly, QCA has the advantage of performing well with large 
and small samples, allowing the generalization of findings to populations (Fiss 2011). 
Hence, all these elements make the QCA method particularly relevant and mostly 
appropriate for this study. 
 
QCA requires expressing variables into sets according to their degree of membership to 
a specific condition. Scores range from “1” (full membership) to “0” (full non-
membership). Cut-off points allow calibrating all values into membership values. 
Usually, 0.95 indicates full membership, 0.05 full non-membership and 0.5 the cases with 
the maximum ambiguity (Ragin 2009). The building and analysis of the truth table 
constitutes the next step. This data matrix has 2k rows, where k is the number of causal 
conditions in the analysis. The range of conditions in the analysis defines a property space 
with k dimensions. Consequently, the property space is a vector space with two corners 
corresponding to the locations. Each row reflects a specific combination of attributes, and 
each column represents a condition. Each case belongs to the combination in which its 
membership score is greater than 0.5 (Fiss 2011). The next step is to reduce the number 
of rows in the truth table. Although several algorithms can logically minimize a truth 
table, the most common choice in fsQCA is a version of the Quine–McCluskey algorithm 
(Quine 1952). 
 
QCA uses Boolean algebra to compute the commonalities among the configurations that 
lead to the outcome. With fuzzy set QCA the Quine-McCluskey algorithm performs the 
logical reduction of statements (Fiss 2007). Two parameters indicate the goodness of fit 
of the final solution: coverage and consistency. The former expresses the empirical 
relevance of a solution and is analogous to the effect size in statistical hypothesis testing. 
Consistency quantifies the extent to which cases sharing similar conditions present the 
same outcome and is analogous to significance metrics in statistical hypothesis testing 
(Wu et al. 2014). 
 
4.6.4 Measures 
The outcome measure is the performance of Lebanese family firms. Given that companies 
surveyed were privately held, it is difficult to collect objective economic performance 
measures (Love et al. 2002) especially in the Middle East where people are more 
conservative about sharing sensitive information (Zahra 2011). Accordingly, this study 
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follows the recommendations of Dess and Robinson (1984) and Eddleston and 
Kellermanns (2007). Dess and Robinson (1984) empirically show that subjective and 
objective performance measures are strongly correlated and have strong convergent 
validity. These authors suggest that subjective measures can serve as a remedy to measure 
firm performance when objective data are unavailable. Following this rationale, 
performance is captured through eight perceptual questions related to growth in sales, 
growth in market share, growth in employees, growth in profitability, return on equity, 
return on total assets, profit margin on sales, and the ability to fund growth from profits 
(Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007). Respondents were asked to rate their company along 
these dimensions compared to their closest competitors over the last 3 years (2015, 2014, 
and 2013). Answers range in a 5-point Likert scale from “1” (much worse) to “5” (much 
better). Reliability of this performance measure was very high (Cronbach’s α = 0.92) 
which is in line with previous studies that found similar high reliability (e.g. Eddleston 
and Kellermanns 2007; Love et al. 2002). Individual scores were then added to compute 
an overall performance score (Dess and Robinson 1984; Eddleston and Kellermanns 
2007; Love et al. 2002). By asking respondents to rate their company performance in 
comparison to its closest competitors, firm size and industry effects are automatically 
controlled for (Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007; Love et al. 2002). 
 
Consistent with the previously outlined argumentation, this study uses 5 causal conditions 
to explain family business performance: family ownership, family management, founder 
involvement in the business as a CEO of the family firm, board size, and the presence of 
at least one independent director on the board. The questions asked to collect these data 
are displayed in Appendix 1. 
 
Although the presence of a family CEO and CEO duality can be important variables that 
affect performance (Bammens et al. 2008; Villalonga and Amit 2006), they are not 
included in the analysis since data did not display enough variability regarding these 
variables. In fact, 94.6% of the cases display CEO duality and 95.9% of the cases have a 
family member as a CEO. These two conditions are very common in the Lebanese 
economy. We triangulated the data collected about the governance structure of companies 
by verifying the answers of respondents through the website www.kompass.com. This 
website provides information about the full names of the top management team and the 
board members of the company, which we used as a proxy to determine the number of 
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family members in the top management team and on the board of directors. The answers 
provided in the phone interviews and the information available on the website were 
completely congruent. 
 
Table 4 shows the transformation of the outcome and the antecedent conditions into fuzzy 
or crisp set terms. The way fuzzy variables are operationalized is consistent with our 
argumentation and with previous literature on family firms (Kraus et al. 2016). 
 
Table 4. Variable definition and calibration values 
 
Condition Description 
Membership threshold valuesa 
Full non-
membershi
p 
(0.05) 
Crossover 
point 
(0.5) 
Full 
membership 
(0.95) 
Firm performancea The sum of individual perceptual performance measures 13.75 30.00 36.00 
Family ownershipc 
Percentage of the business equity held 
by the same family group (100%=1; 
<100%=0) 
0  1 
Independent 
directorsc 
Indicates the presence of independent 
directors on the board (yes=1; no=0) 0  1 
Founder CEOc 
Captures whether the founder is still 
involved as CEO of the company 
(yes=1; no=0)  
0  1 
Family 
managementa 
Percentage of family members in the 
management team 13.49% 50.00% 100.00% 
Board sizeb Number of members in the board of the firm 3.00 4 9.00 
a Observations falling in the percentile-95 are considered to represent full set membership. Percentile-1 5is 
the threshold value for indicating full non-membership. The crossover point is defined by the median. 
b Observations falling in the percentile-95 are considered to represent full set membership. Percentile-02 is 
the threshold value for indicating full non-membership. The crossover point is defined by the mean. 
c Variables expressed in crisp-set terms 
 
4.6.5 Results 
Because QCA assumes complex causality and focuses on asymmetric relationships, the 
QCA methodology requires the analysis of necessary conditions to produce the outcome 
which, in this study, is the performance of family firms (Meyer et al. 1993). A condition 
is necessary when its consistency score is equal or above 0.9 (Schneider and Wagemann 
2010). Table 5 summarizes the consistency and coverage values for all antecedent 
conditions. As the highest consistency value among all conditions is 0.7201, none of the 
variables is a necessary condition to “produce” high family business performance. 
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Table 5. Analysis of necessary conditions 
 Conditions tested* Consistency Coverage family ownership 0.5778 0.5161 ~family ownership 0.4222 0.4950 independent directors 0.5338 0.5891 ~independent directors 0.4662 0.4373 CEO founder 0.5163 0.4967 ~CEO founder 0.4837 0.5186 family management team 0.6093 0.6906 ~family management team 0.6778 0.6218 board size 0.4784 0.7014 ~board size 0.7201 0.5581 
                                     * The symbol (~) represents the negation of the characteristic. 
 
Table 6 displays the results of the intermediate solution as recommended by Ragin’s 
(2009). Using the notation introduced by Ragin and Fiss (2008), black circles (•) denote 
the presence of a condition, white circles (○) represent its absence, and blank cells 
indicate that the condition is not binding in that particular configuration. 
 
Table 6. Sufficient configurations of antecedent conditions for performance 
Frequency threshold = 1; consistency threshold = 0.8122. 
 
 
Six different causal paths lead to high family business performance. Four of them present 
acceptable consistency indices. Raw coverage indices range from 0.04 to 0.23. This 
variety of recipes suggests that these configurations are sufficient but not necessary. 
Configuration 
no. 
Antecedent conditions Coverage Consistency 
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m
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Raw Unique 
1 ⭕  ⭕ ⭕  0.2188 0.0760 0.8202 
2 ⭕   ⭕  0.2343 0.0914 0.8509 
3     ⭕ 0.0445 0.0445 0.7076 
4  ⭕    0.0560 0.0053 0.7955 
5  ⭕    0.1154 0.0394 0.9292 
6  ⭕ ⭕ ⭕ ⭕ 0.0784 0.0530 0.8122 
Solution coverage: 0.5285 
Solution consistency: 0.8137 
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Consequently, no unifying causal governance recipe explains alone family business 
performance. 
 
Following Ragin’s (2010) recommendation, the causal paths with high raw coverage 
(configurations #1, #2 and #5) deserve further attention. This translates into saying that 
these configurations are the most meaningful ones in explaining the outcome and cover 
the greatest proportion of cases that can be explained exclusively by these recipes. 
Particularly, the first two recipes converge in suggesting that when the business is less 
than 100% family owned and when there is low involvement of family members in the 
management team, the presence of independent directors’ becomes a necessary condition 
to achieve high family business performance. The main difference between the two 
configurations is found in the absence of the founder as the CEO (configuration #1) and 
in having a large board (configuration #2). In fact, large boards are significantly linked 
to the age of the firm (Jaskiewicz and Klein 2007). Hence, configuration #2 signals that 
the founder has likely retired or deceased and that the business has been inherited by 
future generations and is thus congruent with configuration #1.  
 
Configuration #5 also displayed high consistency (0.92) and thus deserves further 
attention. This causal path is interesting as it suggests that under the conditions of 100% 
family ownership, high family involvement in management, and the presence of a large 
board, the absence of independent directors is necessary to achieve high family business 
performance. 
 
Several robustness checks were performed. Firstly, we have calculated the average age 
of companies (35 years old) and we have split the sample between older (≥35 years) and 
younger (<35 years) companies. As shown in Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix 2, when we 
compare older companies to younger companies, the acceptable consistency threshold 
value indicates that the recipes found hold better for older companies (≥35 years). This is 
probably because the founder is retired or has deceased, which gives further legitimacy 
for the main configurations found in Table 6. In the third robustness check we have 
replaced independent directors by affiliates who usually have larger tenure on the board 
of directors (Jones et al. 2008). As it can be seen in Appendix 2 Table 10, under these 
circumstances, the solution coverage drops to 0.4711 and the solution consistency 
(0.8067) does not meet the recommended consistency threshold (0.8085). We therefore 
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conclude that the outcome is better modelled when including in the analysis independent 
directors who usually have shorter tenures than affiliates. 
 
4.7 Discussion 
This paper started by highlighting that the relationship between the presence of 
independent directors on the board and family business performance is still theoretically 
debated and empirically inconclusive. Accordingly, the question has shifted from simply 
asking “how will the presence of independent directors affect family business 
performance?” to discussing the circumstances under which the presence of independent 
directors on the board should be considered as an opportunity or a threat for achieving 
high family business performance. 
 
Despite the many theoretical arguments (Corbetta and Salvato 2004a; Nordqvist et al. 
2014) and anecdotal evidence (Samara and Arenas 2017) that suggest that the presence 
of independent directors might not be beneficial to all family businesses, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper that empirically explores when the presence of 
independent directors on the board should be considered as an asset or a liability for 
achieving high family business performance. As expressed by Corbetta and Salvato 
(2004a), p.120): “no single corporate governance arrangement can fit the multifaceted 
needs of companies embedded in different cultural, historical, and institutional settings”. 
Hence, exploring the effect of independent directors on firm performance across different 
combinations of family business governance structures in an understudied yet intriguing 
Collectivist culture offers important theoretical and practical contributions. 
 
Theoretically, these findings empirically validate the ability of agency and stewardship 
theories to offer mutual enabling explanations of family business performance (Madison 
et al. 2016). Hence, instead of arguments grounded in stewardship theory and agency 
theory being presented as a dichotomy, our results show that both theoretical threads 
anchored in agency theory and in stewardship theory can be applicable in accounting for 
the results obtained from different configurations. Hence, future research should consider 
employing these two lenses complimentarily rather than strictly considering one or the 
other as mutually exclusive frames. Moreover, the novel Collectivist cultural setting that 
we offer heeds calls in the literature to explore new institutional settings that can offer 
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richer information on family business governance needs across cultures (Evert et al. 2016; 
Villalonga and Amit 2006). 
 
For practitioners, these findings inform family business owners, advisors, and policy 
makers embedded in the Middle East region that they must make careful attention to the 
family business governance structure before deciding/advising/recommending the 
appointment of independent directors on the board. Specifically, our results show that 
independent directors contribute to business performance when the business is less than 
100% family owned, when family involvement in management is low and when future 
generations become involved in the business. However, when the family owns 100% of 
the business, when family involvement in management is high, and when future 
generations take control of the business, the absence of independent directors becomes a 
necessary condition for better firm performance. Moreover, although families live in the 
larger cultural setting, the mind-sets and reactions of family business employees can 
significantly be influenced by the family structure. Extended family structures that 
dominate Collectivist cultures can also be present in other parts of the world (Sharma and 
Manikutty 2005). Therefore, policy makers and practitioners worldwide must make 
careful consideration to the above outlined contingencies before recommending the 
presence of independent directors on the family business board. 
 
In addition to the theoretical and practical contributions, our research builds on and 
extends previous studies on the effective governance of family businesses. Configuration 
#1 and configuration #2 are in line with the thesis of Anderson and Reeb (2004) stating 
that the presence of independent directors is essential for firm performance when a 
conflict of interest between minority and majority shareholders is likely to occur. While 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) investigated public companies, we contribute to this 
conversation by arguing that, in the context of privately held family businesses embedded 
in Collectivist cultures, the principal-principal agency problem may also arise when 
different extended family groups share business ownership. When this condition is 
coupled with the absence of the founder and low family involvement in management, the 
findings of this paper suggest that the presence of independent directors becomes 
essential to achieve better firm performance. Congruent with both agency and 
stewardship theories, under the aforementioned conditions, the family business will need 
independent directors to monitor its non-family top management team (Jensen and 
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Meckling 1976) to mitigate the principal-principal conflict of interest (Anderson and 
Reeb 2004; Pagliarussi and Rapozo 2011) and to provide industry specific expertise 
(Corbetta and Salvato 2004b). 
 
However, configuration #5 converges with the work of Herrero (2011) who shows that, 
in small family businesses, agency costs are significantly reduced. Results of this paper 
extend the finding of Herrero (2011) by showing that, when the business is 100% family 
owned and when family involvement in management is high, the need for independent 
directors does not only disappear, but can also lead to a decrease in firm performance. 
This finding can be attributed to the Collectivist geographical cultural context in which 
Lebanese family businesses are embedded (Hofstede 1984). As previously argued, in 
Collectivist cultures, strong in-group/out-group perceptions are likely to be formed (Chen 
et al. 2002). Family members are likely to consider their blood-related relatives, family 
friends, and business partners as part of the “in-group” and people that have no prior 
relationship with the family or the business as part of the “out-group” (Ashforth and Mael 
1989). Based on the latter, family business executives may accumulate specific 
knowledge of the firm and independent directors may lack the understanding of family 
dynamics (García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011; Harris and Raviv 2008), both of which 
are crucial for family businesses performance (Sharma and Manikutty 2005). Under these 
circumstances, the presence of independent directors decreases cooperation and 
knowledge sharing inside the family business and eventually leads to a decrease in its 
performance. 
 
4.8 Limitations 
As with all research, this study is subject to some limitations. First, in terms of external 
validity, the sample only includes Lebanese companies. Hence, it would be interesting to 
replicate this study in other Collectivist countries. While the Lebanese Collectivist 
cultural setting is similar to that of the Arab world, it would be interesting to replicate this 
study in other Collectivist geographical settings such as India, China, Japan, or Latin 
America where the countries score for Collectivism can even be higher than that of the 
Middle East region. 
 
Second, given the difficulty of collecting data from the Middle East (Zahra 2011), the 
survey was answered by a single respondent. Although anonymity was assured prior to 
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the phone interviews and although most respondents occupied top managerial positions 
and were well informed about the family business performance, common method bias 
can constitute a threat for the internal validity of the results. Triangulating our results with 
objective data would have been desirable but, given that all the companies surveyed were 
privately held, public and secondary data were not accessible. 
Third, fuzzy methods are sensitive to set calibration. While we have tried to remedy this 
threat by performing several robustness tests, we encourage family business scholars to 
provide clear guidelines in family business research on how to calibrate fuzzy sets, which 
will significantly increase research comparability and the ability of researchers to reach 
better membership breakpoints (Garcia-Castro and Aguilera 2014). 
 
4.9 Avenues for future research 
This study offers several opportunities for future research to contribute to the 
entrepreneurship and family business governance literature. As our results show, the 
cultural setting in which the family business is embedded must carefully be accounted for 
in any study that explores family business governance needs. In this regard, future 
research can perform a cross-cultural study exploring the effect of independent directors 
on firm performance in Individualist and Collectivist countries. This will contribute to 
increase the existing knowledge about different family business governance needs across 
cultures. 
 
Moreover, our study has adopted a positivist philosophical approach where reality has 
been considered as objective. Richer and deeper information about the perceptions and 
attitudes of family business protagonists towards independent directors can be captured 
via qualitative interpretivist methods. Hence, future research can adopt interpretivist and 
ethnographic methodologies to deeply understand the attitude and reactions of family 
business employees towards having independent outsiders on the family business board 
and, consequently, the impact of their presence on firm performance. Relatedly, given 
our cross-sectional data, our study was exploratory by nature. Fellow researchers may 
also employ a longitudinal research design to confirm the causality of the above suggested 
relationships. 
 
Last, in this study, we have only considered the perception of family business employees’ 
vis-à-vis independent directors and how these perceptions play out to affect firm 
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performance. The perception and willingness of independent directors to accept the 
appointment on family business boards is an understudied yet intriguing empirical 
question; one that certainly deserves further attention in future scholarship. 
 
Appendix A 
Table 7 Survey questions used during phone interviews  
Dimension Question Answers 
Family ownership What is the highest percentage 
of business equity held by the 
same extended family in the 
year of 2015 (total family 
ownership of the business)? 
o 100% 
o Less Than 100%. Please specify. 
Family involvement in 
management 
Please provide the following 
information about the top 
management team (executive 
team) of your family business: 
o Number of total positions in the 
management team 
o Number of family members in the 
management team 
Founder CEO Does the founder occupy the 
position of a CEO? 
o Yes 
o No 
Board characteristics Please indicate the following 
information about your board 
of directors: 
o Total number of seats 
o Number of seats occupied by family 
members 
o Number of seats occupied by 
affiliates (people that had previous 
relationships with the family and/or 
the business: lawyers, consultants, 
investment bankers, financiers) 
o Number of seats occupied by 
independent directors (people that 
had no prior relationship with the 
family or the business prior to their 
directorship) 
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Appendix B 
Table 8. Robustness check for older companies (≥35 years) 
 
Frequency threshold = 1; consistency threshold = 0.8417. 
 
Table 9. Robustness check for younger companies (≤ 35 years) 
 
Frequency threshold = 1; consistency threshold = 0.8071. 
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Raw Unique 
1 ⭕  ⭕ ⭕  0.3053 0.3053 0.8530 
2  ⭕ ⭕   0.1271 0.1271 0.9613 
3  ⭕  ⭕  0.0387 0.0387 0.9810 
Solution coverage: 0.4711 
Solution consistency: 0.8896 
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Raw Unique 
1 ⭕   ⭕  0.2312 0.2312 0.8555 
2     ⭕ 0.0700 0.0700 0.7076 
3  ⭕    0.0872 0.0872 0.8888 
4  ⭕ ⭕ ⭕ ⭕ 0.0335 0.0205 1.0000 
5  ⭕    0.3705 0.3122 0.7605 
Solution coverage: 0.7213 
Solution consistency: 0.7962 
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Table 10. Robustness check by replacing independent directors with affiliates 
 
Frequency threshold =1 consistency threshold = 0.8085. 
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5 
 
General Conclusions and Avenues for Future 
Research 
 
 
5.1 General Conclusions 
How can family businesses be managed to achieve better economic and social outcomes? 
The answer “it depends” fits perfectly here. Research shows that family businesses are a 
group of heterogeneous companies (Chua et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2014). In this regard, 
three broad sources of heterogeneity are recognized in the literature (Chua et al., 2012). 
Heterogeneity in goals (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2012), in resources (Habbershon et al., 2003) 
and in governance structures (Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2014). This thesis contributes 
to the literature by exploring the consequences of family businesses heterogeneity in 
resources and governance structures on their ability to achieve their economic and social 
goals. In terms of resources, this thesis focused on how to manage heterogeneity in the 
attitudes, skills, and services of family business employees inside the business to achieve 
fairness between family and non-family employees in the workplace. In terms of 
governance structures, this thesis explored optimal family businesses governance 
structures across different institutional cultural and market settings leading to better 
economic and environmental performance.  
 
The findings reported in this thesis offer several contributions for family business theory 
and practice. Theoretically, the findings show that agency and stewardship theories can 
offer mutually enabling explanations of family business behavior. The combination of 
governance and institutional contingencies are critical to assess when and why each 
theory can explain family business employees attitudes. Specifically, agency theory’s 
core assumptions of opportunism and self-interest seeking behavior are more likely to 
hold when the other with whom family members interacts is perceived as an out-group 
member. In this instance, agency governance mechanisms, such as having independent 
directors on boards, are more likely to be needed to reduce the economic threats that 
opportunistic and self-serving behaviors create. However, when the other with whom 
family members interact is perceived as an in-group member, stewardship theory’s 
humanistic model will more likely reflect family members’ attitudes in the business. 
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Hence, agency governance mechanisms will not be needed and, if adopted, may even 
negatively affect family business economic performance. Knowing whether agency or 
stewardship theory best explains family business employees attitudes is vital for family 
business prosperity, especially that “an inaccurate behavioral assumption will lead to a 
misaligned governance structure, and subsequently results in undesirable behavior and 
negative firm level consequences.” (Madison et al., 2016, p.22). The same reasoning 
applies to the SEW perspective. Building on Kellermanns et al.’s (2012) work, this thesis 
shows that SEW can have both a bright and a dark side by enabling or restricting the 
social performance of family firms. This work contributes to the SEW perspective by 
exploring the circumstances under which SEW is likely to reveal its bright side.  More 
specifically, governance configurations that portray a desire for professionalization and 
that fit the institutional geographical setting in which family businesses are embedded 
can catalyse the bright side of SEW while mitigating its dark side.   
Based on these theoretical contributions, several recommendations for practitioners can 
be proposed. Results of the studies reported above show that, in family businesses, human 
resource decisions should not simply promote equal treatment of family and non-family 
employees while disregarding meritocratic considerations. Disregarding meritocracy 
might lead the family business to unfair practices by discriminating against its own family 
or non-family employees; which can eventually threaten its reputation and performance 
(Samara and Arenas, 2017). In this regard, chapter 2 proposes a fair process as one of the 
possible roads to achieve fairness in the family business workplace by taking into 
consideration merit and qualifications. Family business owners, decision makers, and 
human resource managers can use the proposed process to promote fairness between 
family and non-family employees. Also, social rating agencies can use the proposed fair 
process to evaluate whether fairness exists in the family business workplace and to better 
evaluate the internal social performance of family businesses.  In a similar vein, simply 
recommending having outside and independent directors on the board, without taking 
into consideration other governance and institutional peculiarities, can threaten the family 
business economic performance (Samara and Mirabent, 2017) and can limit the 
opportunities for family businesses to increase their social performance (Samara et al., 
2017). In this regard, chapter 3 and 4 report several governance recommendations that 
can fit different governance configurations that family businesses have, while considering 
institutional settings in which they are embedded. Therefore, policy makers should pay 
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careful attention to the family business governance structure and to the institutional norms 
where family businesses are embedded before recommending “best governance 
practices”. Similarly, family business owners should pay careful attention to the 
ownership and managerial structure of the family firm before deciding whether they 
should appoint outside independent directors on the board.  
 
5.2 Avenues for Future Research and Limitations 
Through conceptual and exploratory studies, this thesis sets the ground for several 
avenues for future research. As empirically witnessed, the institutional geographical 
setting in which family businesses are embedded is a critical factor that predicts the 
attitudes of family business employees in the business (Samara and Berbegal-Mirabent, 
2017; Samara et al., 2017).  With a few exceptions (e.g. Sharma and Manikutty, 2005; 
Pagliarussi and Rapozo, 2011; Salloum et al., 2013; Samara, 2016; Samara and Berbegal 
Mirabent, 2017; Samara el al., 2017), the bulk of family business research has yet to 
account for the national cultural setting in which the business is embedded when building 
theoretical arguments and when discussing empirical findings. Cultural theories can 
provide fertile ground for family business research, especially that culture can shape the 
family structure and family and non-family relations inside the business (Sharma and 
Manikutty, 2005). Integrating national culture into existing theories might provide a 
powerful lens to contextualize existing theories and to reach a finer-grained 
understanding of family businesses embedded in different parts of the world (Sharma and 
Manikutty, 2005; Samara, 2016; Lubatkin et al., 2007).  
 
Moreover, research has just begun to integrate the literature from family science into the 
family business literature (James et al., 2012; Jaskiewicz et al., 2016). Family science can 
provide fertile ground for researching family business heterogeneity through exploring 
how different and changing family structures shape the effective management of family 
businesses across various institutional environments. 
 
Also, when discussing fairness in the family business workplace, there are several 
implicit informal norms at play that challenge the viability of any audit-type process. 
While the process has emphasized the commitment of the family to fairness as a pre-
requisite, the chapter could have benefitted from including how can this process be 
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formalized, and immunized from possible political manipulations that are not uncommon 
in family businesses. 
 
Last but not last least, research conducted in this thesis was either conceptual or 
exploratory. Therefore, causality cannot be claimed. Also, the samples used in the 
empirical studies were relatively small. While QCA does not rest on the assumption that 
data are drawn from a given probability distribution (Fiss, 2011) which makes sample 
representativeness less of an issue than in traditional regression analysis, a larger sample 
size may lead to the detection of new configurations that are not identified in the findings 
reported in this thesis. Moreover, using different methodologies such as experimental 
designs and longitudinal studies will shed further light on the degree and direction of 
association between the proposed relationships. Yet, we must remain cautious that the 
expectation of finding causality is very difficult, if not impossible, in social sciences due 
to the multiple inherent threats to external and internal validity. Therefore, when using 
pure quantitative methodologies, one cannot overemphasize the importance of good 
theoretical grounding to justify the relationships hypothesized and to explain the rationale 
behind the proposed testable models.   
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